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ABSTRACT
In my dissertation, I study factors that influence investments from either corporate or insti-
tutional perspective. First, I examine the sensitivity of corporate investment to internally
generated cash flow and its pattern of change over time across countries. Second, I investigate
how a firm’s customer profile can shape its ownership structure of institutional investors.
Existing studies have documented a puzzling disappearance of investment-cash flow (ICF)
sensitivity in the U.S.. In the first chapter, I explore whether economic and financial de-
velopment can explain the extent of a country’s ICF sensitivity and its evolution through
time. I find that, in aggregate, ICF sensitivity has also faded around the world; yet it has
remained high in countries with low economic and financial development. Further, I find
that the access to external finance, especially equity finance, is a key channel through which
country-level development affects the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. In more
developed countries, external finance has become more accessible for firms when their inter-
nal cash flow is insufficient, thereby reducing their reliance on internal cash flow. The results
indicate that once a country advances to a certain degree of financial and economic devel-
opment, it becomes more efficient in allocating resources and therefore financial constraints
at the individual firm level become less binding.
A growing literature has documented different financial implications of a concentrated
customer base. In the second chapter, I examine how customer concentration affects insti-
tutional investors’ investment decisions. I find that a firm’s customer concentration tends
to attract different groups of institutional investors, depending upon their investment hori-
zons. Specifically, those institutions who trade actively (short-term) would buy the stocks of
firms with a more concentrated customer base. Conversely, those institutions who trade less
actively (long-term) would buy the stocks of firms with a less concentrated customer base.
While the preference of long-term investors is supported by the increased risk associated
ii
with the dependency on a few large customers, I find that the improved stock liquidity is the
channel through which a concentrated customer base attracts short-term investors. Further,
my findings cannot be explained by information transfer along the supply chain.
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Chapter One:
The Fading of Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity and
Global Development
1.1 Introduction
Recent research has discovered puzzling evidence that investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity
in the U.S. has faded over the past fifty years and vanished in the last decade.1 A number of
studies have put forth various explanations for this phenomenon but were unable to identify
the mechanism that is responsible for the trend (see, for example, Chen and Chen (2012)).
In this paper, we examine whether financial development and economic growth can explain
a country’s ICF sensitivity and how it changes over time. Economic theory and empirical
evidence suggest that well developed financial systems eradicate firms’ external financing
constraints and spur economic growth (see Levine, 2005). Hence, individual firms from
developed countries would have easier access to external financing and no longer have to rely
on internal cash flow to finance their investment opportunities, and their ICF sensitivity will
decline.
We begin by examining ICF sensitivity on a sample of 419,318 firm-year observations
from 43 countries across the globe for the period 1991-2014. We divide the whole sample
period into three subperiods of equal length, and perform a pooled analysis by estimating ICF
1See Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Agca and Mozumdar (2008), Brown and Petersen (2009), and
Chen and Chen (2012) for evidence of a declining ICF sensitivity over time.
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sensitivity across firms from all countries in the sample. Our findings provide strong evidence
of a fading ICF sensitivity worldwide; the time trend of investment sensitivity to cash flow
is generally similar to that found in the U.S. Specifically, sensitivity is high and statistically
significant during the first subperiod (1991-1998) of our sample, declines substantially during
the second subperiod (1999-2006), and disappears in recent years (2007-2014). Our results
remain robust after we exclude the U.S. and account for research and development (R&D)
as part of the investment policy.2
We further investigate whether the ICF sensitivity pattern is universal by repeating the
analysis for each individual country, but find evidence of substantial cross-country variation
in ICF sensitivity. On the one hand, nations, such as Australia, Norway, and the U.K.,
have experienced a decline similar to that of the U.S.: the sensitivity is statistically and
economically significant in the 1990s, declines in the 2000s, and becomes non-existent or
even negative in the last decade. On the other hand, in countries such as Brazil, Indonesia,
and Venezuela, ICF sensitivity has remained high, and in some cases, has even increased
over time.
We next explore plausible explanations for cross-country and time-series variations in
ICF sensitivity and ask whether such phenomena could be driven by varying financial and
economic environment. We hypothesize that larger availability of economic and financial
resources, as well as more efficient allocation of these resources within the economy, could
generate positive externalities and reduce financial constraints at the individual firm level.
Our argument is based on studies by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap,
and Scharfstein (1991), and McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) who show that financial con-
straints stem from capital market imperfections, as well as the availability of economic re-
sources at the country level, which give rise to differences between the costs of internal and
external financing. We contend that over the past couple of decades the increasing global-
2Untabulated results show that redefining corporate investment to include selling, general, and adminis-
trative expenses, in addition to R&D, also does not materially alter our main findings.
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ization could have relaxed the severity of financial constraints at the firm level and led to the
disappearance of ICF sensitivity in highly developed countries, but not in developing ones.
To conduct an initial test of this hypothesis, we examine whether the degree of ICF
sensitivity could be related to a country’s level of development, as measured by its overall
scope of resources available, which is proxied by the country’s gross domestic product per
capita (GDPC). We sort countries into terciles based on their level of GDPC (in constant
dollars of 2005) in the following way. For each subperiod, we first calculate each country’s
average GDPC and then use these country-subperiod average GDPC values to sort all coun-
tries independently on time and GDPC dimensions, forming nine bins. It is important to
stress that since independent sort keeps the thresholds of GDPC constant over the entire
period, it accounts for the overall trend of the world-wide GDPC growth. As a result, once
a country reaches a certain threshold of financial and economic development, it moves to a
higher tercile of GDPC in the following period. Since GDPC has increased in a majority of
countries throughout our sample period, there are more (fewer) countries that fall into the
bottom (top) tercile of economic development in the first subperiod than countries that have
low (high) level of development in the most recent period. We then repeat the estimation
of ICF sensitivity based on the cross-section of firms in each of the resulting nine bins. We
find that ICF sensitivity is stable across all subperiods in countries from the lowest GDPC
tercile, but experiences a steep decline, especially in firms that belong to the top tercile. Our
results suggest that the level of a country’s overall development is an important determinant
of the ICF sensitivity pattern across countries.
Since GDPC is a broad measure of economic and financial environment, it could cap-
ture various aspects of a country’s progress. These aspects include the growth of economic
resources available owing to access to education, technological progress, better infrastruc-
ture, and more cross-border investments, as well as the development of financial systems,
including lower intensity of capital control, stronger investor protection, and greater market
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transparency. To zoom in on which aspects of development are crucial in determining the
strength of the ICF link, we repeat our analysis using more specific proxies for economic
and financial development. To capture the extent of a country’s economic development, we
use the secondary school enrollment ratio, amount of electricity consumption, investment
in R&D, and cross-border FDI to proxy for the quality of education, infrastructure, tech-
nological changes, and foreign direct investments, respectively. To test whether financial
development plays a role in explaining ICF sensitivity, we employ broad measures of finan-
cial market quality (such as stock market development, cost of equity, private credit, and
foreign portfolio equity inflows), as well as more specific measures of market transparency
and corporate governance.3 Consistent with the findings based on the GDPC measure, ICF
sensitivity remains high in countries with low levels of development, but vanishes for finan-
cially and economically developed countries, suggesting that factors that increase the overall
wealth of the economy, as well as its efficient distribution, affect individual firms’ reliance
on internally generated capital.
Next, we explore the channel through which country-level development potentially drives
the disappearance of ICF sensitivity in developed countries in recent decades, but not in
emerging markets. To gauge the mechanism at work, we examine whether individual firms’
access to external financing has enhanced as the country becomes wealthier and financially
developed. If country-level development facilitates removal of financial barriers for individual
firms, we should observe more firms turning to external capital to finance their investment
opportunities when internally generated cash flows are insufficient. The reliance on external
capital will, in turn, reduce the sensitivity of investment to internally generated resources and
hence, engender the pattern of decaying sensitivity of investment to cash flow in developed
countries.
To test our conjecture, we estimate the sensitivity of equity and debt issuances to firm-
3The definition and construction of these measures are presented in Appendix A.
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level cash flow. If firms raise more external capital when they have not generated sufficient
internal funds, the sensitivity of external issuances to cash flow should be negative. Alter-
natively, in the presence of limited resources, only established, or otherwise privileged, firms
may enjoy access to external capital markets, and therefore, the sensitivity of equity/debt
issuances to internal cash flow would be insignificant, or even positive. We find that for
developed countries, the sensitivity of cash flow to equity issuance becomes significantly neg-
ative starting from the second subperiod of 1996-2006, which corresponds to the start of the
vanishing ICF sensitivity. The larger magnitude in the last subperiod support the notion
that external equity capital has become more available to firms in need. In contrast, we
find a positive relationship between cash flow and external equity capital in less developed
countries, suggesting that firms operating in economies with limited resources cannot access
external equity capital when they need to do so. Furthermore, the findings indicate that
firms from developed countries are substituting debt for cash flow, while firms from devel-
oping countries show little access to debt finance. Our results remain unaltered when we
account for additional sources of financing (e.g., cash reserves), as well as other aspects of
financial policy (e.g., corporate payouts). Combined, the results provide evidence that ease
of enhanced access to external equity and debt finance is the channel through which country
development influences ICF sensitivity.
Finally, we explore alternative explanations that our main findings can be a result of
(i) measurement error in Tobin’s q; (ii) cash flow persistence; (iii) decreasing importance of
tangible investment; and (iv) industry composition. We address these concerns by employing
Erickson, Jiang, and Whited’s (2014) cumulant estimators, augmenting our main model to
include a lagged cash flow, reestimating our main models based on terciles of asset tangibility,
and also performing subsample analyses by sector. Our findings are insensitive to these
alternative tests.
Overall, our research expands prior empirical U.S.-based studies that debate on the rea-
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sons behind the declining ICF sensitivity.4 We show that an international examination of
the trend in ICF sensitivity sheds light on the causes of its disappearance over time. Our
evidence suggests that firm-level financial constraints are binding largely in an environment
of scarce financial and economic resources. Once a country reaches a certain threshold of eco-
nomic, financial, and legal development, external capital becomes available, which reduces
firms’ reliance on internally generated funds.
The two closest papers to our work are McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012) and Moshirian
et al. (2017), who also examine ICF sensitivity in an international setting. McLean, Zhang,
and Zhao show that countries with weak legal protection exhibit higher ICF sensitivity. Our
research complements their work by examining the evolution of ICF sensitivity over time
and demonstrating that country-level financial development and economic progress play an
important role. Moshirian et al. attribute the decline in ICF around the world to changes
in asset tangibility. However, we show that this mechanism alone cannot explain the results
and offer a broader framework of explanations based on various aspects of economic growth
and financial development.
More broadly, our findings on the relationship between external capital and internal
cash flow suggest that even for financially developed countries, the relaxation of financial
constraints has been gradual over time. For example, Bekaert et al. (2016) show that
developed countries, including the U.S., have been in the process of liberalizing their capital
markets throughout the 1980s and part of 1990s. As financial constraints become less binding
in developed countries, firms are able to gain access to external capital and hence, no longer
have to rely on internally generated funds. In comparison, emerging markets have started
to experience a wave of liberalizations mainly in the last two decades. This observation
underscores the gradual process of globalization and highlights the importance of implicit
and explicit financial barriers faced by firms, especially in emerging markets.
4For e.g., see Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Agca and Mozumdar (2008), Ascioglu, Hegde, and
McDermott (2008), Brown and Petersen (2009), Chen and Chen (2012), among others.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the empirical methodology
and data, and establishes the international evidence of ICF sensitivity and also its variation
over time. Section 3 explores various plausible explanations at the country level for the
disappearing ICF sensitivity, and Section 4 examines the channel through which country
development affects the sensitivity. In Section 5, we evaluate alternative explanations, and
the final section concludes.
1.2 Empirical framework and data
In this section, we describe the empirical methodology that is employed to estimate ICF
sensitivity and the data used to construct our sample.
1.2.1 Empirical specification
Following the existing literature,5 we employ the following empirical model to estimate the
ICF sensitivity.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t, (1)
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1;
qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market
value of equity divided by Ai,t−1; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amorti-
zation scaled by Ai,t−1; β1 is the investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity; αi, αc,i, and
αind,i denote firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.
Equation (1) postulates that a firm’s investment depends on not only its investment
opportunities, as proxied by Tobin’s q, but also its internally generated cash flow. Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) argue that when a firm relies on internal funds to finance its
5See, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003).
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investment, it is financially constrained; otherwise, the firm would have access to external
financing by way of equity and debt issuances.
Recent U.S.-based studies show that the ICF sensitivity has been declining and disap-
peared in recent years. To facilitate a comparison of our results with those of prior studies,
we employ (1) as our baseline model. Specifically, we first conduct pooled regressions of
equation (1) on a sample of firms from 43 countries for the entire period (1991-2014), as
well as three subperiods (i.e., 1991-1998, 1999-2006, and 2007-2014). Using subperiod anal-
yses allows us to examine evidence of a declining ICF sensitivity in both U.S. and non-U.S.
countries over time.
1.2.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
Our sample is obtained from Worldscope for the period from 1991 to 2014. The selection
of the sample period is constrained by the availability of data on emerging markets that
mainly begin in the 1990s. Worldscope contains annual firm-level data, including financial
statement variables and the market value of equity. Following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003) and McLean, Zhang, and Zhao (2012), we exclude financial firms and firms with
negative book values of equity. We further winsorize all financial variables at the 1st and
99th percentiles in each year. Our final sample includes only firms with non-missing main
variables and therefore contains 419,318 firm-year observations across 43 countries from 1991
to 2014.
Table 1-1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables employed in estimating our base-
line model (1) by country and by subperiod, with the last row of the table showing mean
values of the variables for all countries. For each country and each subperiod, we report the
number of observations and mean values of the three variables: investment (
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
), Tobin’s
q (qi,t−1), and cash flow (
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
).
The summary statistics show substantial cross-country variation in the number of firm-
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Table 1-1
Means of Key Variables Across Periods by Country
This table presents the number of firm-year observations (N), average values of investment (
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
),
Tobin’s q (qi,t−1), and cash flow (
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
) for three subperiods by country, where Ii,t is firm i’s capital
expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by Ai,t−1; CFi,t is firm
i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization, scaled by Ai,t−1. The sample period is between 1991
and 2014.
N
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
qi,t−1
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
Country 1991- 1999- 2007- 1991- 1999- 2007- 1991- 1999- 2007- 1991- 1999- 2007-
1998 2006 2014 1998 2006 2014 1998 2006 2014 1998 2006 2014
Argentina 144 387 499 0.117 0.045 0.072 1.243 1.146 1.740 0.106 0.063 0.082
Australia 1,449 6,233 10,767 0.087 0.100 0.118 1.528 2.014 2.140 0.084 -0.104 -0.187
Austria 448 529 463 0.072 0.072 0.069 1.401 1.470 1.392 0.085 0.073 0.080
Belgium 504 676 626 0.082 0.080 0.053 1.329 1.710 1.501 0.095 0.103 0.067
Brazil 695 1,521 1,657 0.249 0.071 0.067 0.976 1.227 1.534 0.150 0.083 0.084
Canada 2,847 7,609 13,987 0.125 0.136 0.135 1.640 2.320 2.236 0.080 -0.071 -0.195
Chile 392 977 1,067 0.111 0.059 0.063 1.626 1.341 1.614 0.132 0.093 0.087
China 362 6,243 16,713 0.074 0.074 0.073 1.408 1.821 2.287 0.065 0.055 0.075
Colombia 90 155 197 0.060 0.041 0.069 1.108 0.805 1.292 0.072 0.082 0.095
Denmark 891 907 846 0.079 0.070 0.056 1.472 1.637 1.780 0.093 0.082 0.033
Finland 583 906 854 0.091 0.077 0.048 1.242 1.830 1.552 0.104 0.104 0.073
France 3,171 4,409 3,804 0.066 0.061 0.046 1.304 1.751 1.446 0.086 0.077 0.063
Germany 2,866 4,431 3,925 0.094 0.062 0.049 1.530 1.711 1.588 0.093 0.050 0.058
Greece 52 855 1,741 0.089 0.070 0.050 1.489 1.613 1.083 0.136 0.076 0.021
Hong Kong 1,262 4,569 6,203 0.074 0.052 0.047 1.338 1.471 1.522 0.075 0.023 0.015
India 1,309 3,037 14,340 0.129 0.090 0.095 1.759 1.654 1.405 0.108 0.120 0.084
Indonesia 632 1,491 2,211 0.130 0.060 0.075 1.488 1.201 1.590 0.072 0.076 0.096
Ireland 391 448 384 0.077 0.068 0.041 1.526 2.460 1.767 0.059 0.014 0.013
Israel 127 972 2,688 0.087 0.045 0.036 1.645 1.678 1.517 0.076 0.041 0.007
Italy 1,008 1,368 1,497 0.064 0.057 0.043 1.149 1.527 1.279 0.065 0.061 0.044
Japan 5,376 23,111 26,431 0.052 0.038 0.035 1.395 1.256 1.135 0.047 0.046 0.052
Luxembourg 50 151 191 0.091 0.061 0.063 1.341 1.741 1.602 0.104 0.082 0.094
Malaysia 1,526 4,606 6,411 0.096 0.050 0.046 2.084 1.167 1.117 0.083 0.057 0.061
Mexico 436 729 666 0.094 0.055 0.061 1.524 1.115 1.587 0.096 0.081 0.091
Netherlands 1,082 1,183 889 0.083 0.066 0.050 1.514 1.903 1.592 0.126 0.090 0.071
New Zealand 271 620 786 0.074 0.074 0.061 1.419 1.820 1.779 0.106 0.064 0.009
Norway 684 976 1,162 0.136 0.098 0.086 1.606 1.868 1.622 0.089 0.046 0.008
Pakistan 339 706 1,416 0.083 0.090 0.068 1.418 1.206 1.299 0.093 0.124 0.103
Peru 104 428 630 0.104 0.057 0.071 1.569 1.062 1.508 0.136 0.120 0.128
Philippines 295 840 1,007 0.138 0.049 0.061 1.660 1.153 1.926 0.091 0.032 0.079
Poland 119 664 2,235 0.149 0.086 0.067 1.499 1.453 1.563 0.136 0.101 0.063
Portugal 281 399 315 0.077 0.057 0.044 1.070 1.231 1.163 0.081 0.072 0.059
Singapore 894 2,831 4,063 0.097 0.059 0.055 1.535 1.306 1.279 0.071 0.067 0.057
South Africa 999 1,980 1,789 0.082 0.078 0.072 1.608 1.604 1.635 0.124 0.099 0.094
South Korea 1,074 5,398 11,831 0.097 0.060 0.060 1.068 1.070 1.203 0.036 0.049 0.035
Spain 797 855 822 0.057 0.068 0.048 1.195 1.589 1.529 0.082 0.096 0.059
Sweden 946 1,946 2,615 0.085 0.053 0.039 1.502 2.225 2.092 0.094 0.008 -0.011
Switzerland 933 1,399 1,327 0.067 0.052 0.043 1.282 1.749 1.740 0.093 0.075 0.064
Thailand 967 2,164 3,339 0.101 0.067 0.061 1.500 1.191 1.349 0.085 0.101 0.095
Turkey 194 1,094 1,810 0.243 0.090 0.059 2.546 1.708 1.400 0.311 0.126 0.070
United Kingdom 8,902 9,357 8,823 0.078 0.065 0.050 1.694 2.110 1.892 0.089 0.006 -0.018
United States 27,512 41,519 32,372 0.085 0.064 0.061 1.986 2.449 2.201 0.072 -0.029 -0.022
Venezuela 49 111 76 0.081 0.045 0.068 1.001 0.687 0.925 0.108 0.094 0.122
Total 73,053 150,790 195,475 0.086 0.065 0.067 1.689 1.834 1.709 0.080 0.020 0.010
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year observations and main variables. The total number of observations increases from 73,053
in the first subperiod to 195,475 in the last subperiod, as Worldscope’s coverage of many
developing countries increases.
On average, there is a gradual fall in a firm’s investment and a steep decline in cash
flow over the three subperiods. In contrast, during these two corresponding subperiods,
Tobin’s q rises. For example, the average investment of firms relative to total assets declines
from 8.6% during the first subperiod (1991-1998) to 6.7% in the last subperiod (2007-2014),
and the decline is more pronounced in emerging than in developed countries. Similar to
investment, cash flow on average also declines considerably from 8.0% in the first subperiod
to 1.0% in the third subperiod. The majority of countries experience a decrease in cash flow;
among these countries, Australia, Canada, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S. have an average
negative cash flow in the third subperiod. In light of the large drop in both investment and
cash flow during this sample period, it is important that our subsequent analysis evaluates
the economic significance of the cash flow impact on investment.
1.2.3 ICF sensitivity: cross-country evidence
In this section, we first confirm the existence of ICF sensitivity around the world. Next, we
examine whether the sensitivity has disappeared over time. Analyzing a large international
sample provides more robust evidence on whether the disappearing sensitivity is specific to
the U.S., or is prevalent across both developed and developing countries.
Table 1-2 reports the estimates of β1’s and β2’s from firm-level panel regressions of equa-
tion (1). Throughout this study, all t−statistics (shown in parentheses) associated with the
regression coefficients are adjusted for standard errors clustered at the country level. For
robustness, we employ different definitions of the dependent variable. In Panel A of the
table, the dependent variable is defined as a firm’s capital expenditure relative to the firm’s
beginning-of-period total assets, whereas in Panel B, it is computed as the ratio of the sum
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of the firm’s capital expenditure and R&D spending to the firm’s beginning-of-period total
assets.6 The latter definition incorporates the intangible investment of the firm; its impor-
tance has increased significantly over the last decades (see, for example, Peters and Taylor
(2017)). In the last four columns of Panels A and B, we exclude the U.S. to ensure that our
results are not driven by the large number of U.S. firms in the sample.
Our results show strong international evidence of investment-q effects but less robust
finding in ICF effects. On average, investment is positively and strongly associated with q
across the entire sample period and three subperiods, but not robustly related to cash flow.
For example, in Panel A, the coefficient of q is 0.011 (t =7.64) for the whole sample period,
and ranges between 0.007 (t =9.00) and 0.017 (t =23.94) for the individual subperiods. Of
particular interest is the monotonically declining cash flow effect on investment. Specifically,
the investment sensitivity to cash flow, as captured by β2, drops from 0.124 (t =4.60) to
-0.003 (t =-0.21) across the subperiods, with an overall effect of 0.018 (t =1.39) for the full
period. Figure 1 shows the declining sensitivity for all countries with and without the U.S.
and compares these graphs with that of the U.S. only. It is apparent that the diminishing
sensitivity is not unique to the U.S.; non-U.S. countries have very similar ICF sensitivity
trends.
Next, we evaluate the economic significance of the impact of cash flow on investment.
Examining economic significance of coefficients in the context of ICF sensitivity is especially
important. Beyond providing an intuitive way to evaluate the magnitude of cash flow impact
on investment, economic significance also accounts for time-series trends in the distribution
of variables of interest that could affect the interpretation of our results. For example, Table
1-1 indicates that the level of investment has declined by about 22.1% from the first to the
last subperiod (8.6% vs. 6.7%). While this decline is consistent with the increasing role of
technology and diminishing importance of tangible capital in many nations, especially more
6The results remain qualitatively similar when we add R&D with SG&A expenses.
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Table 1-2
ICF Sensitivity Around the World
This table reports coefficients obtained from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1 in Panel
A and capital expenditure plus R&D in Panel B; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net
income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity. All
regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed
effects, respectively. Robust t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country
level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted
R-squared value. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗,
respectively. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on
sample mean investment.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
All Countries All Countries Excluding U.S.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Investment (Capital Expenditure Only)
q 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.014***
(7.64) (23.94) (9.00) (7.19) (7.24) (12.06) (6.98) (7.80)
CF 0.018 0.124*** 0.017* -0.003 0.020 0.176*** 0.029** -0.001
(1.39) (4.60) (1.96) (-0.21) (1.05) (7.59) (2.62) (-0.07)
N 419318 71667 146642 194075 317896 44692 106061 162204
R¯2 0.46 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.54 0.52 0.46
Economic 0.061 0.196 0.064 -0.012 0.061 0.228 0.089 -0.005
Significance
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Investment (Capital Expenditure and R&D)
q 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.017***
(11.44) (15.26) (16.05) (8.61) (7.31) (9.87) (6.97) (7.57)
CF 0.031* 0.163*** 0.035*** 0.001 0.029 0.199*** 0.046*** 0.001
(1.93) (8.23) (4.10) (0.05) (1.24) (7.94) (3.52) (0.06)
N 419318 71667 146642 194075 317896 44692 106061 162204
R¯2 0.52 0.62 0.59 0.53 0.48 0.55 0.55 0.49
Economic 0.078 0.209 0.094 0.003 0.072 0.242 0.116 0.004
Significance
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Figure 1-1
ICF Sensitivity Across All Countries and the U.S. by Year
This figure presents yearly cross-sectional regression estimates of investment-cash flow sen-
sitivity (ICF) based on three different samples: firms from all 43 countries, firms from all
countries except for U.S., and firms from U.S. only. The investment-cash flow sensitivity,
denoted by β2, is estimated from the following model.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αt + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets,
Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the
market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation
and amortization. All variables are demeaned at firm level.
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developed countries, it could also provide a plausible explanation of the decline in ICF. A
similar argument applies to the evolution of ICF sensitivity over time. Increased cash flow
volatility in the recent period (Moshirian et al.; 2017) could also mechanically reduce the
coefficient of cash flow in our estimation.
Our results indicate that a one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s cash flow leads
to a 6.1% increase in the mean investment in the full sample period. A closer analysis
indicates that across subperiods, a one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s cash flow
induces a 19.6% increase in mean investment in the first subperiod but a decrease of 1.2%
in mean investment in the third subperiod. Thus, the decline in ICF sensitivity is also
economically important; its decreasing economic magnitude also implies that our findings
cannot by explained by the declining importance of tangible capital and by higher volatility
of cash flow over time.
Arguably, our evidence of the disappearing ICF sensitivity could also be driven by a
single country or a group of countries. Prior studies have documented that ICF sensitivity
of U.S. firms has been decreasing over time (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Agca and
Mozumdar, 2008; Ascioglu, Hegde, and McDermott, 2008; Brown and Petersen, 2009) and
has disappeared in the past decade (Chen and Chen, 2012). Given the robust evidence of
the diminishing ICF sensitivity in the U.S., as well as the relatively high proportion of U.S.
firms in the international sample, it is possible that our international evidence could be
driven by the presence of U.S. firms. To rule out this possibility, we exclude the U.S. from
our analysis and find that the results shown in the last four columns of the panel remain
materially unchanged.
Panel B shows the results based on the alternative expanded investment definition. The
inclusion of R&D spending in our definition of investment also does not qualitatively affect
our key finding. The coefficients of ICF sensitivity, along with their t−statistics, are slightly
larger than their counterparts reported in Panel A of the table. Based on the economic
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significance of the cash flow magnitude, it suggests that the cash flow impact on investment
decreases through time, regardless of the definition of corporate investment. The implication
of these findings is that while asset intangibility accounts, to some extent, for the reduced
cash flow effects on investment, it is not able to fully explain the disappearing phenomenon
during the last subperiod.
For further robustness checks, Table 1-3 reports regression results by country and type
of markets (developed vs. emerging). Over the entire sample period, ICF sensitivity is 0.111
for emerging markets, compared to 0.004 for developed markets; the former is statistically
different from zero but the latter is not. The larger sensitivity in emerging markets suggests
that firms from these markets rely more on internally generated cash flow to finance their
investment than their developed counterparts. Overall, the results further reinforce our key
evidence that in aggregate, ICF sensitivity has faded across the globe, especially in developed
markets, and that the sensitivity varies substantially across countries.
1.3 Why has ICF sensitivity disappeared in some countries?
Corporate finance theory and empirical studies suggest that market imperfections arising
from underdeveloped economic and financial systems may constrain firms’ ability to finance
investment projects (for example, King and Levine (1993), Demirgu¨ -Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Wurgler (2000), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001),
among others.) Recent trends of worldwide globalization, financial development, and eco-
nomic growth could have relaxed the severity of financial constraints at the firm level and
led to the disappearance of ICF sensitivity around the world, especially in more developed
countries. Thus, guided by theory, this section explores whether country development is the
driver of the fading ICF sensitivity and whether this sensitivity is a manifestation of financial
constraints at the country level.
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Table 1-3
ICF Sensitivity by Country
This table reports coefficients on cash flow obtained from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow by country,
as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αt + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q,
measured as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t
is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity; αi and
αt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. Robust t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered
at the firm level. DEV denotes developed market, whereas EMG represents emerging market. Statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Market Full Period Subperiods
Country Type 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
Argentina EMG 0.108*** 0.677*** 0.051* 0.115**
Australia DEV -0.031*** 0.117** -0.013 -0.040***
Austria DEV 0.139** 0.374*** 0.044 0.203*
Belgium DEV 0.131** 0.388*** 0.016 0.035
Brazil EMG 0.130*** 0.142** 0.108*** 0.108**
Canada DEV -0.022*** 0.181*** 0.041** -0.042***
Chile EMG 0.132*** 0.097 0.149 0.056
China EMG 0.183*** 0.345 0.088*** 0.198***
Colombia EMG 0.246*** 0.242 0.205* 0.279*
Denmark DEV 0.055* 0.176* 0.059 0.025
Finland DEV 0.125*** 0.288*** 0.141*** 0.085***
France DEV 0.109*** 0.308*** 0.086** 0.063***
Germany DEV 0.076*** 0.318*** 0.032** 0.043***
Greece EMG 0.138* 0.231 0.262*** 0.096
Hong Kong DEV 0.049*** 0.113** 0.058*** 0.019*
India EMG 0.272*** 0.473*** 0.233*** 0.238***
Indonesia EMG 0.151*** 0.143*** 0.168** 0.156***
Ireland DEV 0.052 0.220*** -0.006 0.065*
Israel EMG 0.005 0.141 0.022 -0.001
Italy DEV 0.070 0.363*** 0.014 -0.054
Japan DEV 0.060*** 0.186*** 0.032*** 0.050***
Luxembourg DEV 0.144** 0.196 0.162 0.089
Malaysia EMG 0.131*** 0.218*** 0.084*** 0.110***
Mexico EMG 0.144*** 0.071 0.112** 0.144*
Netherlands DEV 0.042 0.208*** 0.058*** -0.062
New Zealand DEV 0.040 0.660 -0.040 0.036
Norway DEV 0.055** 0.224** 0.022 0.041
Pakistan EMG 0.186*** 0.168 0.299*** 0.098**
Peru EMG 0.098** 0.132 0.160** -0.033
Philippines EMG 0.027 0.472*** 0.023 -0.046
Poland EMG 0.099*** 0.367 0.170** 0.088***
Portugal DEV 0.063* 0.205 -0.018 0.058
Singapore DEV 0.099*** 0.262** 0.103*** 0.079***
South Africa EMG 0.074*** 0.317*** 0.072*** 0.052
South Korea EMG 0.049*** 0.087** 0.039 0.045***
Spain DEV 0.174*** 0.228*** 0.263** 0.069**
Sweden DEV 0.022* 0.165** 0.023* 0.013
Switzerland DEV 0.046** 0.313*** 0.004 0.013
Thailand EMG 0.079*** 0.019 0.124*** 0.074*
Turkey EMG 0.120*** 0.417* 0.117*** 0.057*
United Kingdom DEV 0.023*** 0.119*** 0.000 0.003
United States DEV 0.014*** 0.077*** 0.003 -0.009
Venezuela EMG 0.211*** 0.292*** 0.121 0.393***
DEV 0.004 0.113*** 0.009 -0.022**
EMG 0.111*** 0.193*** 0.090*** 0.099***
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1.3.1 Country development and ICF sensitivity
We first ask whether changes of a country’s financial and economic environment influence the
severity of financial constraints faced by firms within the country. The extent of a country’s
development could impact ICF sensitivity in several ways. First, the growth of national
output increases the propensity of households in the economy to save. As a result, the
amount of resources that could be channeled to firms in the form of external financing also
grows. Second, developments of financial systems facilitate the flow of capital and contribute
to more efficient allocation of existing resources. Taken together, the two forces could have
improved access of individual firms to external capital and relaxed financial constraints of
individual firms. To test this prediction, we start with the most expansive and general
measure of growth, and ask whether the level of GDPC, which captures both economic and
financial aspects of country-level development, could explain the observed variation in ICF
sensitivity. We perform our empirical analysis in the following way.
For each subperiod, we first calculate each country’s average GDPC (in constant dollars
of 2005). Next, we rank these country-subperiod values from the largest to the smallest
and find the GDPC thresholds that split the resulting distribution into three groups of equal
size. The thresholds are time-invariant by construction. The bottom tercile contains the least
developed countries, whereas the top tercile consists of the most developed countries. Within
each tercile, country-subperiod average GDPC values are then grouped by their respective
subperiods. This approach is essentially equivalent to an independent time-GDPC sort and
permits us to capture time variation in the degree of economic and financial development of
each country, as well as the overall rising trend. In this way, once a country attains a certain
threshold of financial and economic development, it moves to a higher tercile.
Table 1-4 reports the distribution of countries across GDPC-formed terciles. Given that
the majority of countries have enjoyed tremendous economic growth and improvements in
financial systems in the past two decades, there are more countries that fall into the top
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GDPC-formed tercile of economic and financial development in the most recent subperiod
than countries that have a high level of development in the first period. For example,
the top GDPC tercile contains 18 countries in the last subperiod, but only 8 countries
in the first subperiod. Not surprisingly, the U.S. remains in the top tercile throughout
the three subperiods, whereas emerging markets such as the Philippines and South Africa
fall consistently in the bottom tercile. Other countries, however, experience substantial
movements across the terciles. For example, Singapore is in the middle tercile in the first
two subperiods, but move to the top tercile in the last subperiod. On the other hand,
Argentina and Turkey are in the bottom tercile in the first two subperiods, consistent with
the economic crises in both countries during these subperiods, but move to the middle tercile
in the third subperiod.
Within each subperiod-tercile, we estimate β2 of equation (1) using firm-level panel regres-
sions. Table 1-5 presents regression results, with the last row showing economic significance
of the cash-flow coefficient. The table yields several interesting findings. First, time-series
patterns of ICF sensitivity distinctly differ across the terciles. For firms from the least devel-
oped tercile, their average cash-flow coefficients are all positive and statistically significant,
showing no sign of vanishing sensitivity. In contrast, for firms from the most developed
tercile, their cash-flow coefficient is positive only in the first subperiod, is insignificant in
the second subperiod, and becomes negatively singificant in the last period. These striking
differences in the coefficient of ICF sensitivity across terciles reflect varying extents to which
firms from countries with varying degrees of economic wealth and development utilize inter-
nal funds for their investment opportunities. Furthermore, consistent with prior studies,7
the coefficient of q is positive and statistically significant across all terciles and over time.
For a given period, the magnitude of q is fairly similar across different terciles.
7See, for example, McLean, Zhao, and Zhang (2012).
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Table 1-4
Distribution of Countries across GDPC-Subperiod Terciles
This table shows the distribution of countries sorted independently based on their average GDP per capita (GDPC) computed
over each subperiod. The entire sample period is divided into three subperiods: 1991-1998, 1999-2006, and 2007-2014. We
sort countries into terciles based on their level of GDPC (in constant dollars of 2005) in the following way. For each subperiod,
we first compute each country’s average GDP per capita and then sort the country-subperiod averages from the largest to
the smallest and find the thresholds that split the resulting distribution into three groups of equal size. As a result, we end
up with nine GDPC-subperiod bins based on two time-invariant breakpoints.
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
Countries that Remain in the Same Tercile througout the Sample Period
Brazil Brazil Brazil Greece Greece Greece Denmark Denmark Denmark
China China China Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Japan Japan Japan
Colombia Colombia Colombia Israel Israel Israel Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg
India India India Italy Italy Italy Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand Norway Norway Norway
Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Portugal Portugal Portugal Sweden Sweden Sweden
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan South Korea South Korea South Korea Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland
Peru Peru Peru Spain Spain Spain United States United States United States
Philippines Philippines Philippines
South Africa South Africa South Africa
Thailand Thailand Thailand
Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela
Countries that Move from a Lower to a Higher Tercile Across the Sample Period
Argentina Argentina Argentina
Chile Chile Chile
Mexico Mexico Mexico
Poland Poland Poland
Turkey Turkey Turkey
Australia Australia Australia
Austria Austria Austria
Belgium Belgium Belgium
Canada Canada Canada
Finland Finland Finland
France France France
Germany Germany Germany
Ireland Ireland Ireland
Singapore Singapore Singapore
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom
19
Table 1-5
GDP Per Capita and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization;
β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and
industry-year fixed effects, respectively. We divide the sample into terciles based on GDP per capita. We rank country-period averages into
high, middle, and low terciles. The above regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust
t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year
observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF
on sample mean investment. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
q 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.013***
(7.86) (6.38) (3.36) (6.67) (7.34) (11.91) (4.86) (6.06) (6.94) (55.69) (8.36) (5.46)
CF 0.149*** 0.205*** 0.103*** 0.148*** 0.067*** 0.161*** 0.060*** 0.034*** -0.004 0.081*** 0.006 -0.024**
(5.64) (5.85) (7.42) (4.49) (6.01) (6.06) (6.39) (3.82) (-0.38) (8.27) (1.24) (-2.45)
N 83044 8449 24195 49632 78834 26416 19333 32040 256433 36724 103060 112353
R¯2 0.39 0.54 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.52 0.40 0.34 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.53
Economic 0.237 0.231 0.195 0.232 0.164 0.226 0.168 0.112 -0.018 0.152 0.025 -0.112
Significance
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Second, the economic significance of the cash flow coefficient shows a clear distinction
in the cash-flow impact on investment between the two extreme terciles of countries. While
the cash-flow effect on investment is consistently high in the bottom tercile, it has fallen
dramatically from the first to second and third subperiods in the top tercile. In fact, for
the latter tercile, their investment is no longer sensitive to the level of cash flow during the
last two subperiods of our sample. As seen in the table, a one-standard deviation increase
in a firm’s cash flow, on average, leads to a 19.5%-23.7% increase in mean investment in low
GDPC countries, compared with -11.2%-15.2% in high GDPC countries.
Arguably, firms can also use existing cash reserves to finance their investment. Given
the increasing importance of cash holdings (for example, Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009),
this could explain the declining ICF sensitivity in developed countries. To rule out this
explanation, we control cash holdings in our analysis, and the untabulated results suggest
that our key findings remain qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 1-5.
In summary, the results suggest that country development plays a critical role in the
disappearance of ICF sensitivity in highly developed markets over the past two decades.
1.3.2 The role of economic versus financial development
In this subsection, we attempt to take a closer look at economic versus financial aspects of
country-level progress and try to establish more specific aspects of development that have
contributed to the decline in ICF sensitivity. It is important to note that disentangling
the two in a precise way is a notoriously difficult task, since financial development and
economic growth are closely linked. As a country becomes wealthier, potential benefits
of international trade may call for lifting of cross-border capital constraints. At the same
time, more developed financial systems reduce the cost of capital, leading to more profitable
investment opportunities, and in turn, stimulate economic growth. Moreover, both economic
and financial development could be driven by a common omitted variable, such as political
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regime. While the set of variables we propose cannot disentangle the aspects of financial
versus economic development in a precise manner, the collective evidence on the importance
of economic and financial development factors lends support to the country development
channel and helps mitigate alternative explanations.
Effects of economic development
We assume a standard form of production function and use characteristics of input factors
that could affect a country’s total output. Our study employs four different measures of
economic development; the information of which is available from World Development Indi-
cators (WDI). The first measure captures the characteristics of labor capital and is proxied
by the ratio of secondary school enrollment. As more people have access to education, the
labor force in the economy grows, and the marginal productivity of labor capital increases.
The second measure of economic development accounts for the role of infrastructure, as prox-
ied by electricity. Access to electricity increases the marginal productivity of capital, such as
machinery, and also reduces reliance on capital in fixed supply, such as land. The use of elec-
tricity could also be viewed as a measure of technological development for underdeveloped
countries, since manual tasks can be automated using electronic machinery and equipment.
The third measure is the country-level R&D scaled by GDP, which serves as a more direct
measure of technological changes, which foster entrepreneurial activity and hence economic
development. The last measure is the foreign direct investment (FDI), which serves as a
means to gauge the extent of a country’s economic development through the benefits of
cross-border investments.
Appendix A contains the definitions and sources of these proxies for economic devel-
opment and those for financial development; the latter of which will be discussed in the
subsequent subsection. Appendix B depicts the cross-correlation between these measures of
economic and financial development, GDPC, and ICF sensitivity. As expected, our proxies
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for a country’s development are highly correlated with ICF sensitivity and that their correla-
tion with ICF sensitivity is all negative, except for ICOC, which bears a positive correlation
(i.e., the higher the ICOC, the greater is the sensitivity of investment to cash flow).
We employ the same methodology that we used to form GDPC terciles to test whether
specific characteristics of economic development explain the fading ICF sensitivity. We sort
the countries based on the average measure of development for each subperiod and then
determine two time-invariant breakpoints that allow us to allocate countries into their re-
spective tercile bins. The bottom tercile contains the least economically developed countries,
whereas the top tercile consists of the most developed ones. Within each tercile, country-
subperiod averages are then grouped by their respective subperiods.
Table 1-6 reports the panel regression results based on each measure of economic devel-
opment and its format is the same as that of Table 1-5. As the results suggest, economic
development plays a critical role in explaining the disapperance of ICF sensitivity. In highly
economically developed countries, ICF sensitivity vanishes in the last two subperiods, com-
pared with the highly positive and significant ICF sensitivity in underdeveloped countries.
For example, ICF sensitivity becomes statistically insignificant or negative in the top tercile
of countries during the last two subperiods, consistent with the U.S. evidence. But the sen-
sitivity in the bottom tercile of countries remains positive and statistically significant across
the subperiods. The middle tercile yields broadly similar results to those of the top tercile.
The importance of economic development in explaining ICF sensitivity is also evidenced
in the economic magnitude of the cash-flow coefficient. A one-standard deviation increase in a
firm’s cash flow in the first subperiod, on average, leads to a 16.4%-23.5% increase in the mean
investment in the most economically developed countries and a similar magnitude increase
in the mean investment in the least developed group (17.8%-24.7%). This evidence suggests
that internally-generated cash flows are important in funding investment opportunities in
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Table 1-6
Economic Development and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of
equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF
sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. We divide the sample into
terciles based on proxies for economic development (electricity consumption per capita, secondary school enrollment ratio, R&D expenses, and FDI). For each proxy,
we rank country-period averages into high, middle, and low terciles. The above regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A.
Robust t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year observations, and
R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on sample mean investment. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
Low Electricity Consumption Middle High Electricity Consumption
q 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.013***
(5.38) (6.02) (3.43) (10.20) (16.31) (9.92) (9.52) (11.23) (5.93) (31.86) (7.29) (5.46)
CF 0.151*** 0.205*** 0.113*** 0.147** 0.052*** 0.162*** 0.029 0.044* -0.002 0.092*** 0.007 -0.023*
(4.46) (5.68) (7.58) (2.91) (3.15) (4.85) (1.65) (1.81) (-0.17) (5.07) (1.21) (-2.06)
N 59890 7623 23936 27760 103864 23613 27691 51208 254462 40343 94959 115065
R¯2 0.40 0.54 0.43 0.35 0.39 0.47 0.43 0.40 0.51 0.59 0.56 0.52
Economic 0.229 0.232 0.203 0.216 0.147 0.232 0.097 0.142 -0.008 0.164 0.031 -0.100
Significance
Low Secondary School Enrollment Middle High Secondary School Enrollment
q 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.016***
(10.69) (5.67) (6.22) (6.54) (18.72) (143.81) (9.37) (12.13) (6.32) (5.06) (3.47) (7.56)
CF 0.141*** 0.215*** 0.087*** 0.151*** 0.023*** 0.093*** 0.008 0.010 -0.020* 0.195*** 0.005 -0.032***
(5.48) (5.31) (6.48) (4.61) (2.89) (5.33) (1.40) (0.75) (-1.94) (7.90) (0.31) (-4.04)
N 87660 10801 27574 48565 238694 46347 95285 93646 87427 13736 20966 51802
R¯2 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.37 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.46 0.50
Economic 0.242 0.247 0.196 0.239 0.088 0.170 0.035 0.046 -0.071 0.233 0.016 -0.127
Significance
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Table 1-6 - Continued
Economic Development and ICF Sensitivity
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low R&D Middle High R&D
q 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.011***
(7.61) (4.91) (5.76) (5.08) (5.13) (8.42) (7.57) (6.50) (9.23) (118.08) (7.45) (5.53)
CF 0.079*** 0.212*** 0.093*** 0.041** 0.018 0.149*** 0.021 -0.002 0.010 0.094*** 0.008 -0.011
(4.02) (3.99) (4.80) (2.35) (0.59) (6.80) (1.23) (-0.05) (0.80) (4.19) (1.31) (-0.80)
N 50094 7962 21149 20491 115637 18921 24467 71109 248191 42622 99895 101738
R¯2 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.43 0.54 0.45 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.56 0.52
Economic 0.183 0.246 0.223 0.119 0.051 0.214 0.061 -0.006 0.039 0.169 0.036 -0.051
Significance
Low FDI Middle High FDI
q 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.009*** 0.015***
(3.60) (24.53) (4.22) (3.46) (5.19) (12.15) (8.18) (6.49) (4.74) (4.11) (5.89) (4.68)
CF 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.068*** 0.097* 0.005 0.152*** 0.003 -0.004 -0.000 0.185*** 0.027** -0.019
(4.22) (3.98) (3.89) (2.06) (0.38) (6.20) (0.69) (-0.23) (-0.02) (5.17) (2.79) (-1.04)
N 136403 45270 39055 51196 178663 20241 63792 93127 100747 5557 43762 49728
R¯2 0.50 0.59 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.35 0.55 0.48
Economic 0.198 0.178 0.155 0.192 0.022 0.215 0.014 -0.017 -0.002 0.235 0.090 -0.081
Significance
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both developed and developing countries in the earlier period of our sample. However, the
results differ substantially across the development-formed terciles during the last subperiod.
For example, a one-standard deviation increase in a firm’s cash flow in the last subperiod,
on average, reduces 5.1%-12.7% in the mean investment in the top tercile, compared to a
11.9%-23.9% increase in the bottom tercile, suggesting that the advancement of economic
development contributes to the fading ICF sensitivity in the recent decade.
Effects of financial development
We now zoom in on the financial side of country-level development. Existing research
shows that well-functioning financial markets and availability of capital resources are the
key to economic growth as they improve firms’ access to outside capital and reduce the
cost of raising outside capital (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine, 2005). Easy access to
external finance allows firms with limited internal cash flow to pursue profitable investment
opportunities that require large investment. Rajan and Zingales show that industries that
depend on external financing have the ability to grow faster in countries with better developed
financial systems. Wurgler (2000) shows that the development of financial systems facilitates
efficient allocation of resources to productive industries. Love (2003) shows that a country’s
financial development mitigates investment obstacles by reducing information asymmetries
and contracting imperfections.
The above discussion suggests that firms from countries with fewer financial imperfections
should be able to raise external funds to exploit their growth opportunities. With greater
access to external finance, a firm’s investment becomes less contingent upon the availabil-
ity of internal capital. Therefore, as financially developed countries greatly reduce market
impediments to their sources of external capital, ICF sensitivity of firms from these coun-
tries could decrease and then vanish in recent years. In contrast, firms from less financially
developed countries, where capital is scarce, could still face greater financial barriers even
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today and hence, continue to have limited access to external finance. These firms would rely
more on internally generated cash flows, and therefore, their ICF sensitivity should remain
significant.
To test these predictions, we first construct general measures of financial development.
We follow King and Levine (1993), La Porta et al. (1997), and Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
employ the size of a country’s equity markets relative to its GDP as a proxy for the general
level of financial development. We also measure the aggregate cost of equity financing by
employing the average of four different implied cost of equity (ICOC) estimates as a proxy
for each firm’s yearly cost of capital. For each country and for each year, we then employ the
value-weighted average of firms’ ICOCs as a proxy for the country’s cost of equity financing.8
As a second step, we consider particular aspects of financial system development. Specifi-
cally, we look at the availability of domestic versus foreign resources to determine whether the
source of capital matters in determining the financial constraints faced by individual firms.
To capture the availability of within-country resources, we use the amount of available pri-
vate credit scaled by GDP (Private Credit). To examine whether lifting of cross-border
constraints could be another mechanism that allows more efficient allocation of resources
across countries, we employ the flows of portfolio equity into a country (Portfolio Equity
Inflows).
Finally, we look at investor protection. Existing studies find that regulatory environ-
ment, particularly investor protection, promotes efficient allocation of financial capital and
enhances firms’ access to external finance.9 Thus, firms that operate in countries where
investor protection laws have remained weak could be more sensitive to the existence of
financial constraints due to contracting imperfections and high degrees of information asym-
metries. To test this hypothesis, we use an investor protection index (Protection) and a
8See Hail and Leuz (2006) and Lau, Ng, and Zhang (2010) on the specifications and assumptions of the
four models we use to estimate the ex ante cost of equity capital as implied by each model.
9See, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Makismovic (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998).
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financial disclosure index (Disclosure). Countries with strong investor protection tend to
have a more transparent information environment and lower level of information asymme-
tries (Lau, Ng, and Zhang, 2012). With lower information asymmetries, external financing
costs associated with information acquisition should be lower.
The six different measures of financial development are detailed in Appendix A, with
their correlation matrix in Appendix B. Note that the measures of investor protection and
disclosure are time-invariant and therefore, do not allow for countries to switch categories
over time. As a result, we cannot allocate countries into bins over time in the same flexible
manner as we did in the previous analysis. Due to the limitation of these measures, it is still
possible that ICF sensitivity fades in groups of varying levels of investor protection. Yet if the
financial system has advanced more rapidly in countries with strong investor protection and
transparent information environment, we should observe a steeper decline in ICF sensitivity
in these countries than in countries with weak investor protection and opaque information
environment.
Consistent with the analysis in Tables 5-6, we sort countries into terciles based on their
level of financial development, with the bottom tercile consisting of firms from least finan-
cially developed countries and the top tercile consisting of those from most developed ones.
Within each group of countries, we conduct firm-level panel regressions of model (1) for the
full sample period and for three subperiods. Table 1-7 presents regression results for each
measure of financial development. The findings are broadly consistent with those shown in
Tables 5 and 6 in terms of the levels of statistical and economic significance of the cash-flow
coefficient, and are independent of the proxy for financial development we employ. Specifi-
cally, the cash-flow coefficient is lower for countries with most advanced financial devlopment
compared with that for countries with least financially developed economy. The sensitivity
disappears in 1999-2006 and 2007-2014 subperiods for the top tercile but remains strongly
significant for the bottom tercile. For example, for terciles formed based on the level of
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Table 1-7
Financial Development and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of
equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF
sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. We divide the sample
into terciles based on proxies for financial development (stock market capitalization, cost of equity financing, private credit, portfolio equity net inflows, protection,
and disclosure). For each proxy, we rank country-period averages into high, middle, and low terciles. The above regression is conducted separately for each tercile.
All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the
number of firm-year observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on
sample mean investment. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
Low Stock Market Development Middle High Stock Market Development
q 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(4.29) (5.45) (3.55) (4.70) (6.31) (5.99) (5.73) (7.09) (6.10) (39.89) (6.75) (6.05)
CF 0.126*** 0.225*** 0.098*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.173*** 0.042*** 0.074** 0.005 0.097*** 0.011 -0.013
(9.01) (6.93) (6.39) (4.61) (4.41) (4.36) (3.82) (2.53) (0.47) (5.54) (1.45) (-0.94)
N 38697 14586 13025 10751 125121 11767 45645 66814 253969 45249 87918 116459
R¯2 0.47 0.56 0.40 0.37 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.54 0.48
Economic 0.208 0.259 0.179 0.162 0.156 0.209 0.097 0.177 0.021 0.174 0.046 -0.054
Significance
High Cost of Equity Financing Middle Low Cost of Equity Financing
q 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.006** 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.011***
(8.28) (6.07) (2.94) (8.07) (6.04) (13.82) (2.67) (5.79) (9.72) (25.99) (8.06) (5.25)
CF 0.109*** 0.183*** 0.092*** 0.101** -0.000 0.140*** 0.056** -0.018 0.009 0.102*** 0.010 -0.018
(3.26) (6.03) (4.33) (2.79) (-0.02) (6.98) (2.65) (-0.91) (0.77) (3.74) (1.53) (-1.45)
N 83738 8604 17483 56768 85293 16843 13738 54372 247065 45869 115200 82818
R¯2 0.39 0.56 0.41 0.37 0.47 0.54 0.41 0.47 0.51 0.56 0.55 0.54
Economic 0.205 0.227 0.194 0.197 -0.001 0.197 0.112 -0.071 0.035 0.179 0.041 -0.088
Significance
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Table 1-7 - Continued
Financial Development and ICF Sensitivity
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Less Private Credit Middle More Private Credit
q 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.003** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.013***
(4.32) (3.92) (2.23) (7.89) (7.90) (11.28) (5.08) (7.86) (7.09) (85.86) (9.10) (6.22)
CF 0.162*** 0.215*** 0.130*** 0.146** 0.053*** 0.167*** 0.015 0.052*** 0.002 0.081*** 0.012 -0.018
(4.30) (5.54) (5.54) (3.02) (2.86) (5.80) (0.81) (4.36) (0.14) (8.33) (1.51) (-1.48)
N 45836 7046 11614 26646 96841 27631 34979 33038 273838 36876 100002 133199
R¯2 0.40 0.59 0.42 0.35 0.44 0.51 0.46 0.36 0.50 0.57 0.56 0.51
Economic 0.241 0.249 0.231 0.217 0.134 0.223 0.045 0.158 0.007 0.153 0.054 -0.079
Significance
Less Portfolio Equity Inflows Middle More Portfolio Equity Inflows
q 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.007*** 0.012***
(6.06) (26.12) (3.49) (10.46) (5.25) (7.16) (3.83) (5.06) (7.33) (11.29) (9.36) (5.37)
CF 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.058*** 0.007 0.202*** 0.011 -0.009 0.010 0.131*** 0.015 -0.009
(7.40) (5.21) (3.94) (5.07) (0.30) (6.30) (0.56) (-0.37) (0.84) (7.97) (1.64) (-0.48)
N 79105 34334 9307 35145 137659 20866 25945 90322 197215 15872 111312 68586
R¯2 0.46 0.56 0.36 0.35 0.49 0.61 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.55 0.48
Economic 0.165 0.166 0.185 0.149 0.024 0.238 0.033 -0.035 0.040 0.197 0.064 -0.038
Significance
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Table 1-7 - Continued
Financial Development and ICF Sensitivity
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Weak Protection Middle Strong Protection
q 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(7.88) (3.87) (10.45) (4.50) (6.73) (5.19) (5.17) (3.93) (5.68) (32.59) (6.16) (5.96)
CF 0.060*** 0.218*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.069*** 0.195*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.006 0.101*** 0.010 -0.017
(6.57) (4.57) (4.68) (5.79) (5.22) (8.39) (3.23) (3.17) (0.46) (5.09) (1.35) (-1.21)
N 63073 10186 20966 30795 93990 13965 36648 42240 235374 46942 82062 101887
R¯2 0.35 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.56 0.54 0.48
Economic 0.151 0.248 0.119 0.121 0.165 0.250 0.114 0.136 0.022 0.177 0.043 -0.068
Significance
Low Disclosure Middle High Disclosure
q 0.006*** 0.010** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.014***
(5.05) (2.20) (4.12) (7.86) (4.00) (8.53) (3.56) (4.45) (5.55) (34.62) (7.09) (4.74)
CF 0.100*** 0.223*** 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.000 0.183*** 0.007 -0.015 0.014 0.100*** 0.014 -0.008
(6.76) (6.11) (3.40) (3.02) (0.01) (6.30) (0.48) (-0.74) (1.03) (5.08) (1.38) (-0.43)
N 40149 8315 14709 16568 134930 17114 48833 66939 217329 45656 76106 91417
R¯2 0.47 0.63 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.56 0.55 0.47
Economic 0.193 0.269 0.151 0.150 0.001 0.218 0.022 -0.059 0.054 0.175 0.059 -0.034
Significance
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stock market development, the ICF sensitivity is positive and highly significant across all
subperiods in countries with the lowest stock market development, but it disappears in the
last two subperiods in countries with high stock market development.
In summary, we find that a country’s economic and financial development contribute to
the declining or disappearing ICF sensitivity. It is possible that firms in these countries are
likely to have better access to external finance and hence, their investments are less sensitive
to cash flow.
1.4 External financing
In this section, we test a possible channel through which economic and financial developments
could reduce firms’ reliance on internally generated funds. Theory and empirical evidence
suggest that financial liberalization, economic growth, and capital openness reduce financing
constraints and in turn, improve efficient capital allocation of resources (e.g., Love, 2003;
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, 2001, 2005). Therefore, constrained firms are better off in
more economically and financially advanced countries rather than in their less developed
peers, where the cost of capital is substantially greater owing to a limited pool of resources
available. Our evidence, thus far, is consistent with the argument that economically and
financially developed countries ease financial constraints and hence, facilitate greater access
to external sources of capital than do their less developed counterparts. As a result, their
investment is insensitive to internally generated capital. To further support this conjecture,
we explicitly test the relationship between equity or debt financing and internal cash flow,
in order to assess whether firms rely more on equity and debt capital in recent decades if
they have insufficient internal funds to finance their investment.10
10We have also tested whether equity flows from foreign investors offer another possible channel, but
unreported results show no evidence to support this channel.
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1.4.1 Univariate analysis
Financial development facilitates the removal of financial barriers facing countries and pro-
vides opportunities for firms to raise external finance.11 If firms from more economically
and financially developed countries have better access to external sources to finance their
investment opportunities, then much of the firms’ investments would be financed externally
when firms have insufficient internal resources. As a result, the effect of internal cash flow on
investment should decline, and hence, the relation between external funding and internally
generated cash flow would be negative.
To examine the validity of this channel, we start by conducting a univariate analysis.
We compute the yearly change in firms’ equity and debt within terciles formed based on
each of our earlier defined measures of economic and financial development over the full
sample period and three subperiods. Given that the results are consistent across our diverse
set of country development measures, to conserve space, we only report those based on
GDPC-formed terciles.
Table 1-8 shows the average of the annual change in firms’ equity and debt by GDPC-
formed tercile. The table reveals distinct cross-sectional and time-series patterns. First, over
the entire sample period, firms from the top tercile of developed countries issue substantially
more equity and debt than their counterparts from the bottom tercile. With more advanced
financial systems, it is not surprising that the firms in developed countries have the ability
to raise large amounts of external funds in the form of equity and debt. For example, during
the full sample period, top tercile firms issue 12.3% equity and 2.7% debt, compared with
6.4% and 0.5% for the bottom tercile firms. Notice that firms from both developed and
developing countries tend to raise more equity than debt.
11Hubbard (1998) provides an excellent review of theoretical and empirical studies that have shown a
strong relationship between firms’ financial status and investments.
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Table 1-8
Means of Equity and Debt Issuances by GDP Per Capita
This table presents average values of the change in equity and debt. ∆Equityi,t is firm i’s annual change in equity; ∆Debti,t is firm i’s
annual change in debt. Both are scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1. We divide the sample into terciles based on GDP
per capita. We rank country-period averages into high, middle, and low terciles. All definitions are in Appendix A.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
∆Equity 0.064 0.236 0.053 0.039 0.054 0.056 0.049 0.054 0.123 0.070 0.134 0.130
∆Debt 0.050 0.118 0.035 0.045 0.033 0.036 0.028 0.035 0.027 0.042 0.027 0.023
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Second, across the subperiods, both equity and debt issuances decline dramatically from
the first to third subperiods in the bottom tercile, but in contrast, equity issuances shoot
up in the top tercile. These results indicate that firms in most developed countries are
increasingly relying on external finance, especially on equity, in recent decades. Importantly,
equity issuances by firms from high GDPC countries rise from 0.070 in 1991-1998 to 0.130 in
2007-2014, whereas issuances by those from low GDPC countries fall from 0.236 to 0.039. On
the other hand, debt issuances by top tercile firms fall slightly from 0.042 to 0.023, compared
to a larger drop from 0.118 to 0.045 by bottom tercile firms. In comparison, equity and debt
issuances by middle tercile firms are fairly stable across the sample period; equity issuances
are 0.049-0.056 and debt issuances are 0.028-0.036.
Taken together, these statistics provide a preliminary explanation of why firms from
developed markets are no longer dependent on internally generated cash flow.
1.4.2 Multivariate analysis
We next examine the relation between external finance and internal cash flow in a multi-
variate setting. To test our hypothesis, for each GDPC-formed tercile, we run the following
firm-level regression within a subperiod.
∆Equityi,t[or ∆Debti,t]
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + γ1qi,t−1 + γ2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t, (2)
where ∆Equityi,t is defined as the change in book equity, plus the change in deferred taxes,
minus the change in retained earnings, and ∆Debti,t is defined as the annual percentage
change in total debt. The remaining variables are as defined earlier. All regressions include
unreported firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.
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Table 1-9
Equity Issuance-Cash Flow Sensitivity and GDP Per Capita
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing a firm’s annual change in equity financing on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
∆Equityi,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + γ1qi,t−1 + γ2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where ∆Equityi,t is firm i’s annual change in equity, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and
amortization. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.
We divide the sample into terciles based on GDP per capita. We rank country-period averages into high, middle, and low terciles. The
above regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust t−statistics are computed based on
standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted
R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on sample mean of the change of
equity. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
q 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.030** 0.047*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.077*** 0.094***
(5.11) (3.94) (2.67) (5.49) (15.78) (7.05) (9.95) (9.17) (13.40) (25.51) (16.66) (11.98)
CF 0.374* 0.559** 0.186 0.493* -0.264*** 0.293*** -0.122 -0.411*** -0.803*** -0.056 -0.687*** -0.930***
(1.99) (2.63) (0.98) (2.13) (-3.39) (3.91) (-1.42) (-4.98) (-11.05) (-1.21) (-11.30) (-12.48)
N 82021 8318 23774 49160 77724 26064 19001 31596 249851 36205 99970 109522
R¯2 0.67 0.94 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.47 0.31 0.44 0.50
Economic 0.724 0.318 0.461 1.464 -0.781 0.611 -0.411 -1.367 -1.826 -0.120 -1.437 -2.183
Significance
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Table 1-9 reports the results of estimating equation (2), with the annual change of equity
as the dependent variable. The findings indicate that the cash flow coefficients and their levels
of statistical significance vary substantially across the subperiods and across terciles. The key
observation is that, on average, the effect of cash flow on equity issuances is negative for firms
from most developed countries, but is positive for those from least developed ones. Consistent
with our prediction, evidence indicates that firms from the most developed markets have
greater access to external equity finance, which is in accord with the firms’ decreasing reliance
on cash flow over time. For example, the cash flow coefficient of these firms varies from -0.056
(t =-1.21) in 1991-1998 to -0.930 (t =-12.48) in 2007-2014. In terms of economic significance,
a one-standard deviation decrease in the cash flow will lead to a 12.0% increase in equity
issuances in the former subperiod and to a 218.3% increase in the latter.
In contrast, for firms from the lowest GDPC-formed countries, the cash flow effect is
positive and mainly statistically significant, indicating that firms with low cash flow have
limited or no access to external finance. The implication is that in an economy with limited
resources, only profitables firms are able to raise external capital. This finding is consistent
with our earlier results which show a strong positive relation between investment and cash
flow for these firms. With limited access to external finance, these firms have to depend on
internal cash flow to finance their investment. As seen in the table, their cash flow coefficients
vary from 0.186 (t =0.98) in 1999-2006 to 0.559 (t =2.63) in 1991-1998. Furthermore, for
firms from the middle tercile, the sign of cash flow switches from positive in 1991-1998 to
negative in 2007-2014, implying that these firms have limited access to equity finance in the
first subperiod, but have more access to sources of external finance in the recent subperiod
when their countries become more developed.
It is plausible that the sensitivity of equity financing to cash flow could be driven by
firms’ other financial policies, such as corporate payouts. For example, profitable firms in
developed countries may consistently repurchase shares, and this will lead to the observed
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negative relation between changes in equity and cash flow. If firms in developed countries
are more concerned about catering to investors and choose to pay out instead of investing,
this would also explain the decline in ICF sensitivity. It is also possible that firms in devel-
oped countries raise capital in order to pay dividends, rather than to invest (Ferra-Mensa,
Michaely, and Schmalz, 2017), which will undermine the validity of the external equity chan-
nel that drives the fading ICF sensitivity. To eliminate these concerns, we conduct two tests.
First, we construct a modified measure of equity issuance by assigning the value of zero to all
observations with a negative change in equity. Second, we define a new variable, net equity
issuances, as the difference between the change in equity and payouts. We then repeat our
estimation of model (2) using each of the modified issuance measures, and find that the
relationship between cash flow and equity issuance is still negative for developed countries
in the past two subperiods (the results are unreported for the sake of brevity).
Table 1-10 reports the results of equation (2), with the annual change of debt as the
dependent variable. The results, while weaker, are broadly consistent with those of Table
1-9. Firms from the top tercile of countries are substituting debt for cash flow throughout the
entire sample period. The cash-flow effect is negative, but statistically significant in the last
subperiod (i.e., -0.026 with a t-statistic of -2.57), suggesting a 33.2% rise in debt issuances
following a one-standard deviation fall in cash flow. However, firms from the bottom tercile
of countries show little access to debt finance. The substitution between debt and cash
flow, to a large extent, results from the gradual reduction of barriers to external finance.
Their cash-flow coefficient is positive across the period, but only statistically significant in
the last subperiod. Combined, the results provide evidence that ease of enhanced access to
external equity and debt finance is the channel through which country development affects
ICF sensitivity.
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Table 1-10
Debt Issuance-Cash Flow Sensitivity and GDP Per Capita
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing a firm’s annual change in debt financing on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
∆Debti,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + γ1qi,t−1 + γ2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where ∆Debti,t is firm i’s annual change in debt, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and
amortization. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.
We divide the sample into terciles based on GDP per capita. We rank country-period averages into high, middle, and low terciles. The above
regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust t−statistics are computed based on standard
errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared
value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on sample mean of the change of debt. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
q 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.010** 0.015*** 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.025*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(9.90) (4.67) (2.49) (11.40) (12.08) (9.44) (6.23) (6.16) (14.44) (36.18) (17.16) (5.03)
CF 0.094** 0.059 0.042 0.130*** 0.014 0.193*** 0.030* -0.040* -0.023* -0.002 -0.028 -0.026**
(2.76) (1.05) (1.46) (3.51) (0.55) (4.33) (2.12) (-1.89) (-1.82) (-0.09) (-1.38) (-2.57)
N 83000 8447 24189 49596 78768 26415 19309 31999 256053 36708 102985 112063
R¯2 0.26 0.59 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.09
Economic 0.233 0.067 0.159 0.338 0.067 0.632 0.174 -0.209 -0.231 -0.007 -0.284 -0.332
Significance
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1.5 Alternative Explanations
1.5.1 Measurement errors
A number of studies such as Erickson and Whited (2000, 2012) have argued that q may be
measured with error. If this is the case, then it is possible that a decline in stock market
inefficiencies over time could have improved the informativeness of average q, making it
a better proxy for Tobin’s q. The decline in measurement error will, in turn, reduce the
investment sensitivity to cash flow.
It is important to note that this interpretation is still consistent with our main finding
that the extent of country-level development plays a critical role in explaining the fading
of ICF sensitivity in developed countries. The main difference is the underlying channel.
According to the measurement error explanation, economic and financial development has
affected ICF sensitivity through higher informativeness of the shadow value of capital, rather
than through availability of external capital. It is possible that our estimations include a
certain extent of measurement errors, but measurement errors alone cannot explain all of our
results. Specifically, if measurement error in q is the only channel at work, we should observe
a similar pattern of declining cash flow sensitivity in the estimation of equity issuances.
Instead, we find that external capital issuance is negatively and significantly associated with
cash flow in the recent period. The only way to explain this result within the measurement
error framework is by assuming that cash flow has become negatively correlated with growth
opportunities in more developed countries over time.
To address the measurement error issues based on a more formal empirical analysis,
we employ Erickson, Jiang, and Whited’s (2014) higher-order cumulant estimator to re-
estimate the results of Table 1-2 for both the full sample and subsamples. Table 1-11
shows the results based on the fifth-order cumulant estimator; the unreported results remain
materially unaffected even if either the third- or fourth-order cumulant estimator is used.
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Table 1-11
Measurement Errors and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as
follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1
is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity
divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-
q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity. The above model is estimated using the fifth order of cumulants
following Erickson, Jiang, and Whited (2014). All variables are demeaned by firm and year separately.
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. Economic
significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF on sample mean investment.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
All Countries All Countries Excluding U.S.
q 0.059*** 0.083*** 0.027*** 0.081*** 0.070*** 0.093*** 0.033*** 0.085***
(37.94) (19.20) (26.68) (44.17) (34.43) (10.64) (18.39) (40.88)
CF 0.048*** 0.099*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 0.169*** 0.035*** 0.044***
(15.68) (9.32) (10.57) (9.29) (11.80) (8.70) (7.51) (8.17)
N 422970 73609 152111 197250 319944 45826 109875 164243
Economic 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.06 0.08
Significance
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The ICF sensitivity still fades over time.
1.5.2 The role of intangible assets and cash flow persistence
Moshirian et al. (2017) show that changes in asset composition could play a role in explaining
the fading of ICF sensitivity over time. Specifically, lower intensity of physical investment
in developed countries over time can explain the cross-country variation in the sensitivity,
as well as the time trend. Consistent with this explanation, our earlier findings suggest
that technological development, measured by access to electricity and R&D intensity, plays
a role in the disappearance of ICF sensitivity in the top tercile of developed countries, and
that investment in intangible assets could be part of technological progress. However, we
also show that this is not the only channel, as cross-country variation in other aspects of
economic growth, such as education, as well as various dimensions of the development of
financial systems, including legal systems, transparency, and institutional environment, also
contribute to the vanishing ICF in most developed countries. Moreover, in Panel B, Table
1-2, we include R&D as part of the investment and re-estimate ICF sensitivity and find
similar results. The sensitivity of both tangible and intangible investments falls across the
entire sample period, but disappears in the last subperiod. This phenomenon is robust across
developed and developing markets. The evidence indicates that asset intangibility cannot
be the key factor that contributes to the fading ICF sensitivity, and is also consistent with
the results shown in Panel B, Table 1-2.
Nevertheless, to further rule out the possibility that asset tangibility is the key driver
of our results, we perform several additional tests. In line with our previous analyses, we
form terciles of countries based on measures of country-level tangibility (which is defined
by the aggregate property, plant, and equipment divided by aggregate total assets within
a country-subperiod). The results, presented in Table 1-12, show that tangibility does not
fully explain cross-country variation in ICF sensitivity, as it declines in groups of countries
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that rely heavily on tangible assets, as well as countries with little reliance on tangible assets.
Finally, we further examine whether the increasing importance of intangible assets affects
ICF sensitivity through cash flow persistence. If operations based on tangible assets generate
more predictable cash flows, ICF sensitivity should be high. One might also argue that firms
that invest in intangible assets may not implement their investment decisions immediately, or
investment may react to changes in expected cash flow. In both cases, firm-level investment
could be more related to lagged than to current cash flow, and such effects might not be
captured in the widely studied contemporaneous relation between investment and cash flow.
To address this issue, we follow Lewellen and Lewellen (2016) who find that adding lagged
cash flow to the regression of investment on contemporaneous cash flow significantly increases
ICF sensitivity. To ensure that our results are not driven by cash flow persistence, we re-
estimate the results in Table 1-5 by incorporating a lagged cash flow. Results reported
in Table 1-13 indicate that the sensitivity to lagged cash flow either is fairly stable in the
bottom and middle terciles, or has fallen in the top tercile. More importantly, the sensitivity
to contemporaneous cash flow has declined over time and vanished in the last two subperiods,
especially in the top tercile of developed countries.
To summarize, we find that while asset composition plays a role in the economic develop-
ment of a country, our results cannot be explained by mechanical changes in ICF sensitivity
due to changes in cash flow and investment characteristics.
1.5.3 Cross-industry evidence
In this subsection, we explore the possibility that the fading ICF sensitivity may be driven
by a certain type of industries whose investments are less dependent on internally generated
cash flow. Due to recent market globalization, some countries have become hubs to certain
industries (for example, support services in India, or electronic manufacturing in China).
As a result, the differences in ICF sensitivity across countries could be essentially driven
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by countries’ specialization in certain industries, which may not be fully picked up by asset
tangibility. To address this concern, we estimate the ICF sensitivity within each industry.
Based on their SIC codes, we sort firms into manufacturing (SIC codes between 2000 and
3999) vs. non-manufacturing firms (SIC codes outside 2000-4000). Manufacturing firms are
further sorted into industry groups, namely durable goods, nondurable goods, and high-tech
sectors. Firms in the durable sector have SIC codes between 2400 and 2599 or between 3200
and 3899, while firms belonging to the non-durable sector have SIC codes between 2000 and
2399 or between 2600 and 3199. Firms in the high-tech sector have three-digit SIC codes
283, 357, 366, 367, 382, or 384. Results are summarized in Table 1-14.
We find that ICF sensitivity exhibits similar patterns across different industries. For man-
ufacturing firms, sensitivity declines from 0.116 (t−statistic=4.50) in the first subperiod to
0.035 (t−statistic=1.88) in the third subperiod, and the sensitivity for the overall sample pe-
riod is 0.045 (t−statistic=2.79). Correspondingly, the sensitivity of their non-manufacturing
peers falls from 0.130 (t−statistic=4.48) to -0.018 (t−statistic=-1.28). Our results remain
robust even when we further split the manufacturing sector into durables, non-durables, and
high tech groups. Even though ICF sensitivity disappears in the high-tech industry during
the last two subperiods, it also has faded in both durables and non-durables industries, fur-
ther reinforcing our earlier finding that intangible assets cannot explain the ICF sensitivity
disappearance.
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Table 1-12
Intangibility and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and
amortization; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm,
country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. We divide the sample into terciles based country-level tangibility, measured by the
aggregate net property, plant, and equipment (PPE) divided by aggregate total assets within a country. We rank country-period averages
into high, middle, and low terciles. The above regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust
t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year
observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF
on sample mean investment. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low Intangibility Middle High Intangibility
q 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.009***
(15.68) (8.64) (6.03) (32.12) (8.20) (47.17) (5.06) (9.16) (32.81) (4.33) (32.55) (14.02)
CF -0.001 0.156*** 0.046*** -0.038*** 0.024 0.087*** 0.016 0.017 0.013 0.287*** 0.008 0.004
(-0.06) (6.11) (4.59) (-3.94) (0.75) (6.67) (0.98) (0.42) (1.32) (13.98) (1.15) (0.46)
N 74876 19162 33734 20756 142833 36454 30783 74958 198590 15987 82077 98319
R¯2 0.49 0.60 0.55 0.46 0.42 0.54 0.48 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.51 0.50
Economic -0.004 0.209 0.126 -0.129 0.066 0.158 0.057 0.048 0.062 0.336 0.036 0.020
Significance
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Table 1-13
Lagged Cash Flow, GDP Per Capita, and ICF Sensitivity
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ β3
CFi,t−1
Ai,t−2
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1 is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and
amortization; CFi,t−1 is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization in the previous year; β1 is investment-q sensitivity; β2 is ICF
sensitivity; β3 is investment-lagged cash flow sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm, country-year,
and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. We divide the sample into terciles based on GDP per capita. We rank country-period averages
into high, middle, and low terciles. The above regression is conducted separately for each tercile. All definitions are in Appendix A. Robust
t−statistics are computed based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of firm-year
observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Economic significance measures the impact of a one-standard deviation change in CF
(lagged CF) on sample mean investment. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Low GDP per Capita Middle High GDP per Capita
q 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.013***
(7.33) (3.63) (3.14) (7.59) (8.81) (9.02) (4.19) (7.61) (6.22) (33.24) (6.79) (5.43)
CFt 0.120*** 0.203*** 0.102*** 0.119*** 0.055*** 0.143*** 0.058*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.073*** 0.012** -0.015*
(6.26) (5.42) (8.42) (4.39) (5.20) (5.36) (5.37) (4.13) (0.22) (7.23) (2.64) (-1.77)
CFt−1 0.067*** 0.084*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.027*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.017* 0.001 0.050*** 0.009 -0.007
(3.67) (3.11) (3.29) (3.13) (3.97) (3.56) (4.92) (1.83) (0.09) (17.55) (1.30) (-1.24)
N 72987 6416 20545 45272 68561 20876 16488 30533 229177 28183 91704 106112
R¯2 0.39 0.57 0.42 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.41 0.33 0.51 0.61 0.56 0.54
Economic 0.190 0.229 0.194 0.186 0.134 0.201 0.163 0.097 0.009 0.136 0.052 -0.070
Sign. (CFt)
Economic 0.100 0.088 0.094 0.094 0.064 0.060 0.083 0.055 0.004 0.084 0.033 -0.033
Sign. (CFt−1)
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Table 1-14
ICF Sensitivity by Industry
This table reports coefficients estimated from regressing investment on Tobin’s q and cash flow, as
follows.
Ii,t
Ai,t−1
= αi + αc,t + αind,t + β1qi,t−1 + β2
CFi,t
Ai,t−1
+ i,t,
where Ii,t is firm i’s capital expenditure, scaled by its beginning-of-period total assets, Ai,t−1; qi,t−1
is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity
divided by total assets; CFi,t is firm i’s net income plus depreciation and amortization; β1 is investment-
q sensitivity; β2 is ICF sensitivity. All regressions include unreported αi, αc,t, and αind,t, denoting firm,
country-year, and industry-year fixed effects, respectively. The above regression is conducted separately
for manufacturing and non-Manufacturing firms. Manufacturing firms are further divided into durables,
non-durables, and high-tech firms. Industries are based on SIC codes. Robust t−statistics are computed
based on standard errors clustered at the country level and reported in parentheses; N is the number of
firm-year observations, and R¯2 is the adjusted R-squared value. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014 1991-2014 1991-1998 1999-2006 2007-2014
Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
q 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.008*** 0.014***
(11.09) (28.43) (10.70) (8.36) (6.97) (11.51) (7.93) (6.86)
CF 0.045*** 0.116*** 0.025* 0.035* 0.004 0.130*** 0.012 -0.018
(2.79) (4.50) (1.93) (1.88) (0.31) (4.48) (1.63) (-1.28)
N 199932 37548 69016 90540 219377 34110 77626 103535
R¯2 0.38 0.51 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.55 0.50
Economic 0.150 0.202 0.100 0.128 0.014 0.187 0.043 -0.067
Significance
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Table 1-14 - Continued
ICF Sensitivity by Industry
Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods Full Period Subperiods
Variable 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014 1991-2014 1991-19981999-20062007-2014
Durables Non-Durables High-Tech
q 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(12.29) (9.27) (6.05) (10.96) (18.49) (6.99) (9.35) (9.02) (11.88) (27.78) (13.55) (4.88)
CF 0.072*** 0.155*** 0.050** 0.050** 0.086*** 0.153*** 0.060*** 0.075** 0.014** 0.059*** 0.005 0.008
(4.19) (5.83) (2.59) (2.45) (3.71) (6.21) (3.18) (2.28) (2.31) (10.34) (1.03) (0.85)
N 76488 14772 26105 34620 69640 13818 23409 31518 49901 8118 18028 22849
R¯2 0.40 0.54 0.42 0.39 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.52 0.42 0.39
Economic 0.178 0.205 0.147 0.136 0.185 0.192 0.149 0.176 0.078 0.168 0.030 0.050
Significance
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that ICF sensitivity has faded worldwide and has vanished mostly in
highly developed countries. The results suggest that financial development and economic
growth can explain ICF sensitivity across countries and over time. Specifically, firms oper-
ating in less economically and financially developed countries still rely heavily on internally
generated cash flow, and their investment-sensitivity to cash flow has remained fairly sta-
ble over time. These findings are robust to various definitions of investment, hold across
industry subsamples, and also, are not attributed to measurement errors or changes in asset
tangibility.
Firms from most developed countries with fewer or virtually no financial constraints enjoy
the benefits of greater access to external finance. As these firms depend less on internal
cash flow, their investment has become insensitive to the internal cash flow in recent two
decades. Such access to external funding is not that apparent in least developed countries.
In support of this argument, we find that the sensitivity of cash flow to external capital issues
is consistently negative in countries that have experienced most advancement in economic
and financial development, but persistently positive in underdeveloped countries. Overall,
the results are consistent with the notion that firms operating in countries with limited and
inefficient allocation of resources have to resort to internally generated capital, while firms
in more developed countries can access external capital market if they need it.
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Chapter Two:
Does Customer Clientele Shape Investor Clientele?
2.1 Introduction
A growing literature on economics, finance, and accounting has been emphasizing the im-
portance of firms with major customers, and the impact of customer concentration on the
operating performance, investment decisions, and financial policy of firms. Yet the overall
implications of having established, but concentrated customer base are ambiguous. On the
one hand, one strand of literature highlights the benefits of operating efficiency due to lower
selling expenses and higher asset turnover rates (for e.g., Patatoukas, 2012). On the other
hand, reliance on a limited group of customers increases the risk profile of a firm, leading
to more frequent loan failures and higher systematic and idiosyncratic risk (Campello and
Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal et al., 2016).
In this paper we evaluate the trade-off between benefits and costs of concentrated cus-
tomer base by examining how institutions - the dominant and, by large, sophisticated players
in financial markets, evaluate the customer-based profile of a firm. Institutional ownership
has increased dramatically over the past two decades, and their presence affects manage-
ment decisions of a firm whether through direct monitoring or through the threat of exit.
Institutions are also considered sophisticated investors who have the ability to collect and
process information. Therefore, the presence of institutional clientele can shed light on the
50
implications of customer concentration on investor welfare.
To conduct the empirical analysis, we identify firms that report major customers (each
customer firm that accounts for at least 10% of the total sales of a supplier firm) in Compu-
stat Customer Segment Files, and augment this sample with identities of major customers
relying on name-matching algorithms. Institutional investors’ holdings data is from Thom-
son Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F). Their investment horizons are defined based on
how frequently they rotate their equity portfolio holdings.
We start with the baseline analysis and estimate institutional ownership as a function
of customer concentration, as well as a vector of commonly used control variables. We do
not find any significant link between customer concentration and total institutional holding,
yet the lack of relationship at the aggregate level is masked by the opposing behaviors
of short-term versus long-term institutions. Specifically, we find that short-term investors
are attracted to firms with large customer concentration, while long-term institutions shy
away from these firms. These findings are robust to a battery of alternative definitions
of customer concentration. We also address concerns related to non-linearity of investor-
customer concentration relationships, as well as some omitted factor issues by repeating the
analysis using a matched sample technique.
After establishing the baseline results, we turn to addressing endogeneity concerns. Our
results indicate that while short-term and long term investors exhibit diametrically opposing
investment behavior in firms with customer concentration, it is also possible that institu-
tions actively affect managerial decisions, which, in turn, impact customer concentration.
For example, it is likely that there are some unobserved characteristics that are related to
customer concentration on the one hand, and institutional preferences on the other. To
mitigate endogeneity issues, we use the instrumental variable analysis and implement two
different approaches in constructing the instrument. In the first approach, we instrument
(IV) for concentration of an individual supplier firm using the lagged average industry con-
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centration in the suppliers industry (Dhaliwal et al., 2016). Lagged concentration is unlikely
to be an outcome of future pressure by institutional investors. Using the average concentra-
tion across SIC 2-digit industries as our instrument, we find that our IV results are consistent
with the baseline findings. One remaining concern of this analysis is that customer concen-
tration is fairly persistent over time, and therefore, may reflect future levels of concentration
at a firm or industry levels. To further improve our identification strategy, we construct an
alternative instrument using M&A activity in the customer industry (Campello and Gao,
2017). High M&A activity increases the probability of a merger for customers that, in turn,
increases their buyer power and the customer concentration of a supplier firm. At the same
time, M&A activity of the supplier firm is unlikely to affect the institutional holdings of the
supplier through channels other than increased concentration. We find that using the alter-
native way to instrument for customer concentration, short-term investors are attracted to
firms with concentrated customer base, whereas long-term investors choose to underweight
these firms in their portfolio.
In the second part of the paper, we explore potential channels that could explain hetero-
geneous preferences of institutions towards firms with concentrated customer base. Perhaps
the most intuitive explanation of the observed pattern is stock returns. Existing literature
(see, for example, Yan and Zhang, 2009) demonstrates that short-term institutions are bet-
ter informed and exploit informational advantage through trading strategies that lead to
abnormal returns. If customer concentration base can generate abnormal stock performance
due to slow information transfer along the supply chain (Menzly and Ozbaz, 2010), this
mechanism would explain the larger share of holdings by short-term investors. We test the
validity of this explanation in two ways. First, for each supplier we construct a measure
of customers performance as past performance of each customer (returns, profitability, sales
growth) weighted by its share of sales of the supplier’s total sales. If institutional hold-
ing is explained by market segmentation along the supply chain, we should find that the
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performance-adjusted concentration measure explains institutional holdings. We repeat the
estimation of institutional holding using the alternative measure, but find no significant rela-
tion. Second, we test whether firms with high customer ownership generate abnormal future
performance by using a standard asset-pricing test to evaluate the performance of portfo-
lios sorted based on customer concentration levels. We find that a zero-investment strategy
of buying firms with high customer concentration levels and shorting firms with the low-
est levels of concentration, whether equally or value-weighted, does not generate abnormal
performance after controlling for standard risk factors.
The second channel that we consider is risk. Although both short- and long-term insti-
tutions are likely to be risk-averse, the existing literature demonstrates that the two types
vary in their sensitivity to different sources of risk. Investors with high portfolio turnover
are more sensitive to short-term price volatility, and put greater emphasis on stock liquidity,
as stable trading volume and depth insure timely liquidation of outstanding positions at fair
prices (Bushee and Noe, 2000). At the same time, institutions with long investment horizon
and low portfolio turnover prefer low bankruptcy risk and high stability to short-term liq-
uidity benefits. If customer concentration improves liquidity but increases long-term risk of
bankruptcy and financial distress, this mechanism could explain the different preferences of
short and long-term institutions towards firms with concentrated sales distribution. Several
prior studies provide ample evidence that customer concentration increases the long-term
risk profile of the firm (Titman, 1984; Campello and Gao, 2017; Wang, 2008; Dhaliwal et
al., 2016). Yet the link between customer concentration and liquidity has not been formally
established, so we turn to gauging this channel.
Customer concentration may improve stock liquidity through several mechanisms. First,
securing a contract with a large customer is an important event in the life of a supplier
firm, which is reported in company announcements, annual reports, and potentially media
sources. As a result, a supplier, typically a relatively small firm compared to the overall
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universe of publicly-traded firms, becomes more visible to market participants, increasing
trading volume in the stock. Second, a concentrated customer base is likely to reduce infor-
mation asymmetry. As required by regulations, a supplier must disclose information of major
customers who account for at least 10% of its total sales. Investors demand information on
a firm’s customer base, because they can access risks inherent in sales (See Ellis, Fee, and
Thomas, 2012; Patatoukas, 2012), and evaluate the supplier’s investments, as dependency
on a few major customers is associated with relationship-specific investments (See Titman
and Wessels, 1988; Kale and Shahrur, 2007). Besides, existing literature shows that large
customers often require higher levels of information disclosure (see Hui, Klasa, and Yeung,
2012; Samuels, 2016). Greater information disclosure lessens the price impact of individual
trades, which in turn, facilitates trading in a stock and hence improves liquidity (Diamond
and Verrecchia, 1991; Bushee and Noe, 2000; Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist,
2014). To test the validity of these arguments, we estimate stock turnover as a function
of customer concentration and find a positive and significant relationship. To address al-
ternative explanations related to omitted firm characteristics that could potentially affect
both variables, we repeat the IV analysis using turnover as the dependent variable and find
results in support of causal effect of customer concentration on liquidity. To further support
the liquidity channel as the mechanism behind the preference of short-term institutions, we
ask whether the effect of customer concentration on ownership is stronger for short-term
institutions with a particularly high portfolio liquidity. We split short-term institutions into
high and low portfolio liquidity subcategories and re-estimate the main specification. We
find that the magnitude of the impact of customer concentration on institutional holding
is economically more significant for short-term investors who hold more liquid portfolio,
consistent with their higher demand for liquidity.
To summarize, we find that institutional groups exhibit heterogeneous preferences to-
wards firms with high customer concentration: Short-term investors increase holdings in
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these stocks, whereas long-term institutions reduce their investment. We examine potential
mechanisms that could explain this pattern, and find that customer concentration alters the
risk profile of supplier firms by reducing short-term risk of trading through higher liquidity,
but increasing the long-term risk through higher probability of distress. We also consider
alternative mechanisms and find that our results cannot be explained by abnormal perfor-
mance of firms with high customer concentration and information transfer along the supply
chain.
Overall, our paper has several contributions to the existing literature. First, we re-
examine the debate on benefits versus costs of customer concentration from a novel angle by
adding the institutional perspective. We show that the benefits of customer concentration
are potentially short-term, whereas the costs are of long-term. This, in turn, suggests that
the answer to the question of whether customer concentration is beneficial to shareholders is
more complex than previously believed, and the trade-off depends on individual preferences
of a particular clientele.
Our second contribution to the literature is discovering a new channel through which
customer concentration affects the financial profile of supplier firms. We show that firms
with customer concentration enjoy improved stock liquidity, which shapes investor clientele
by attracting short-term investors. Our findings open avenues for future research that could
test whether improved liquidity due to higher concentration has other implications, such as
reducing cost of equity capital, affecting investment decisions, etc.
Lastly, we add to the literature on institutional holdings and firm characteristics. While
recent literature has devoted a lot of attention to studying the impact of institutional holdings
on firms managerial decisions and performance outcomes, there is still scant information
about the selection process that institutions implement in their decisions making beyond
standard firm characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratios, and past stock performance.
Our work shows that product market characteristics play an important role in portfolio
55
management decisions of both short- and long-term institutional investors.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the databases used
in this study and provides descriptive statistics of the sample. Section 3 summarizes the
main results, and Section 4 addresses endogeneity tests. In Section 5 we explore potential
mechanisms, and the final section concludes.
2.2 Sample selection, variable measurement, and descriptive statis-
tics
We obtain supplier-customer sales data from Compustat Customer Segment Files to estimate
the customer concentration, institutional holdings data from Thomson Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13F) database to define short-term/long-term institutional investors and their
ownership. The financial statement data and stock market data are from Compustat and
CRSP, respectively. Our main sample consists of all firms with non-missing information for
our main variables from all the databases above during the years 1980 to 2015 12. We exclude
all financial firms (SIC from 6000 to 6999) and utilities firms (SIC from 4900 to 4999). We
winsorize all continuous variables at their top and bottom 1% to reduce the effects of outliers.
Our variables are defined in Appendix. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2-1.
The Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No.14 of Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) requires all public firms to disclose all major customers that account
for 10% or more of their total sales. Compustat Customer Segments Files provide names of
major customers and the dollar amount of sales derived from each major customer at every
fiscal year-end. We use this data to identify major customers and estimate all proxies of
customer concentration. A major customer is defined as a customer firm which represents
at least 10% of its supplier’s total sales. Although not required by regulations, firms often
voluntarily report customers that account for less than the threshold 10% of their total
12Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) data starts its coverage in 1980, while Compustat Cus-
tomer Segment Files start in 1976.
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Table 2-1
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics for our main variables. The sample
includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in Compustat
Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015. A major customer is defined as a
customer that accounts for at least 10% of its supplier’s total sales. Variables are
defined in Appendix C.
N Mean Median Std P25 P75
ST % 46,700 0.072 0.043 0.083 0.003 0.110
LT % 46,700 0.128 0.087 0.128 0.024 0.198
Total % 46,700 0.348 0.275 0.299 0.075 0.586
Total Customer Sales 46,700 0.435 0.370 0.284 0.200 0.610
Customer HHI 46,700 0.163 0.081 0.210 0.032 0.198
Largest Customer 46,700 0.309 0.240 0.205 0.160 0.390
Number of Customers 46,700 1.741 1.000 0.921 1.000 2.000
Tobin’s q 46,700 1.994 1.406 1.780 1.041 2.177
Size 46,700 4.592 4.438 2.137 3.009 6.088
Age 46,700 15.903 12.000 12.217 7.000 22.000
Payout 46,700 0.006 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.001
Volatility 46,700 0.167 0.146 0.092 0.104 0.204
Turnover 46,700 1.187 0.680 1.448 0.288 1.493
Log Price 46,700 1.972 2.108 1.326 1.119 2.970
Return−3,0 46,700 0.021 -0.002 0.314 -0.162 0.157
Return−12,−3 46,700 0.132 0.012 0.655 -0.223 0.317
sales. To reduce the selection bias, we keep firms that have at least one major customer
representing 10% or more of their total sales.
To conduct tests that require specific information on individual customers, we match each
customer name in Compustat Customer Segment Files with the corresponding firm name
in Compustat to get the customer’s gvkey code. The initial matching process is based on
Levenshtein distance and Phonetic matching algorithms. After the automatic matching, we
manually check every matched pair to ensure accuracy.
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2.2.1 Customer concentration
Following previous studies (Patatoukas, 2012; Irvine, Park, and Yildizhan, 2016; Campello
and Gao, 2017; Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh, 2017), we choose the following three
measures to capture the extent of a firm’s customer base concentration.
The first measure is the sum of sales to all major customers of a supplier, scaled by the
total sales of the supplier.
Total Customer Salesi,t =
k∑
c=1
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
where Salesi,t represents the total sales of supplier i in year t, Salesi,c,t represents supplier
i’s sales to its major customer c in year t, and k is the number of major customers of supplier
i in year t. A higher Total Customer Sales captures a more concentrated customer base.
The more the supplier sells to its major customers, the more concentrated is its customer
base.
The second measure is a modification of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), applied
to the distribution of sales to major customers. It is defined as the sum of squared sales
percentages to major customers.
Customer HHIi,t =
k∑
c=1
(
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
)2
where Salesi,t represents the total sales of supplier i in year t, Salesi,c,t represents supplier
i’s sales to its major customer c in year t, and k is the number of major customers of supplier
i in year t. Compared to the first measure, Customer HHI puts more weight on the larger
share of sales.
In the third measure, we focus on the largest share of total sales. It is the share of sales
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to the customer firm that represents the largest share of the supplier’s total sales.
Largest Customeri,t =
max
c
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
where Salesi,t represents the total sales of supplier i in year t, Salesi,c,t represents supplier
i’s sales to its major customer c in year t.
To ensure robustness of our results, we also use alternative samples that include firm-
year observations from the Compustat universe without any major customer reported in
Compustat Customer Segment Files. For those observations, each of the above concentration
measures is set to zero.
2.2.2 Institutional ownership
We define short-term and long-term institutional investors based on their portfolio turnover.
Following Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), for every institutional investor we calculate the
quarterly Churn rate to measure how frequently institutional investors rotate their portfolio
stock holdings over a quarter. The Churn rate is defined as follows:
Churni,t =
∑
j∈Q
|Ni,j,tPj,t −Ni,j,t−1Pj,t−1 −Ni,j,t−1∆Pj,t|
1
2
∑
j∈Q
Ni,j,tPj,t +Ni,j,t−1Pj,t−1
where Q is a set of stocks investor i held in quarter t− 1 or t, Ni,j,t is the number of shares
of stock j held by investor i in quarter t, Pj,t is the price of stock j in quarter t, and ∆Pj,t
is the change in stock j’s price from quarter t− 1 to t 13.
Each quarter, we sort all institutions into terciles based on their average equity portfolio
13This measure captures the change in an investor’s portfolio value net of price changes over a quarter.
Yan and Zhang (2009) use a different measure that separates total buys from total sells and chooses the
smaller one. Our results are robust to this alternative measure as well.
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churn rates over the last four quarters. Institutions in the top tercile are defined as short-term
institutions, while those in the low tercile are defined as long-term institutions. Quarterly
short-term/long-term ownership is the number of shares owned by all short-term/long-term
institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding. Total institutional ownership is the
number of shares owned by all institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding. For
all tests, we match all financial variables, including customer concentration, with institutional
ownership one quarter after the fiscal year-end to ensure that the most recent financial
information is available for institutional investors 14.
2.2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2-1 presents the descriptive statistics for our main sample. The average total institu-
tional ownership is 34.8%. On average, short-term institutional investors hold 7.2%, while
long-term institutional investors hold 12.8%. We report three different measures of customer
concentration. Among firms that have at least one major customer, on average the percent-
age of sales to all major customers is 43.5%, and the HHI index is 16.3%. For the number
of major customers, the median is one and the 75 percentile is 2. Most of our sample firms
have only one or two major customers that account for at least 10% of the supplier’s total
sales. Thus, it is not surprising to see the average percentage of sales to the largest customer
is 30.9%. For most firms, the customer base is dominated by their largest customer.
2.3 Empirical results
2.3.1 Baseline regressions
To assess how customer concentration attracts different groups of institutional investors with
different investment horizons, we estimate the following model:
14Our results hold if we choose two quarters after the fiscal year-end.
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Inst%i,t = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Xi,t + i,t (3)
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (To-
tal%), and Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base con-
centration defined in section 2: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer,
and Xi,t is a set of firm characteristics.
Following Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Yan and Zhang (2009), we include Tobin’s
q, firm size, age, payout ratio, volatility, stock turnover, the log of stock price, and historical
stock returns over the previous year as controls. All regressions include industry-year inter-
acted fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. All variables are defined
in Appendix C.
Table 2-2 presents the results from regressions of institutional ownership on three different
measures of customer concentration. In the first three columns, we use the total sales
to all major customers as a measure of customer concentration. In the first column, the
dependent variable is the ownership of short-term institutional investors, and the coefficient
on customer concentration is positive and statistically significant. One standard deviation
increase in a firm’s total sales to all major customers yields a 7% increase in short-term
institutional ownership relative to the sample median short-term institutional ownership.
Interestingly, the association between the ownership of long-term institutional investors and
customer concentration is opposite. In the second column where the ownership of long-term
institutional investors is the dependent variable, the coefficient on customer concentration is
negative and statistically significant. One standard deviation increase in a firm’s total sales to
all major customers leads to a 2% decrease in long-term institutional ownership relative to the
sample median long-term institutional ownership. When the dependent variable is replaced
with the total institutional ownership in third column, the coefficient on concentration is
61
Table 2-2
Investor Clienteles and Customer Concentration
This table presents results from our baseline OLS regressions. We estimate the following model:
Inst%i,t = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (Total%), Customer Concentrationi,t is
one of the three measures for customer base concentration: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, and Xi,t
includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Payout, Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are defined
in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard
errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in Compustat
Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total %
Total Customer Sales 0.009*** -0.005* 0.008
(3.82) (-1.78) (1.35)
Customer HHI 0.010*** -0.009** 0.006
(3.56) (-2.56) (0.78)
Largest Customer 0.009*** -0.009** 0.004
(3.48) (-2.58) (0.51)
q -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.019***
(-10.34) (-9.79) (-13.77) (-10.31) (-9.82) (-13.77) (-10.25) (-9.83) (-13.74)
Size 0.013*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.013*** 0.026*** 0.074*** 0.013*** 0.026*** 0.074***
(11.94) (14.69) (29.93) (11.86) (14.74) (30.02) (11.85) (14.75) (30.02)
Age -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.006 -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.006
(-6.51) (8.53) (-1.06) (-6.52) (8.49) (-1.08) (-6.52) (8.49) (-1.08)
Payout -0.503*** 0.102 -1.075*** -0.505*** 0.104 -1.076*** -0.504*** 0.104 -1.076***
(-8.80) (1.16) (-5.40) (-8.85) (1.18) (-5.40) (-8.85) (1.18) (-5.40)
Volatility -0.030*** -0.066*** -0.208*** -0.030*** -0.066*** -0.207*** -0.030*** -0.066*** -0.207***
(-3.39) (-5.46) (-6.73) (-3.37) (-5.47) (-6.74) (-3.37) (-5.46) (-6.74)
Turnover 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.003*** 0.025***
(13.61) (3.49) (9.52) (13.66) (3.48) (9.53) (13.66) (3.48) (9.53)
Price 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.045*** 0.009*** 0.015*** 0.045***
(5.58) (6.56) (9.04) (5.58) (6.57) (9.04) (5.59) (6.57) (9.04)
Return−3,0 0.007*** -0.021*** -0.041*** 0.007*** -0.021*** -0.041*** 0.007*** -0.021*** -0.041***
(4.03) (-6.62) (-6.18) (4.03) (-6.63) (-6.17) (4.02) (-6.62) (-6.17)
Return−12,−3 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.019*** 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.019***
(10.12) (-10.35) (-6.63) (10.13) (-10.34) (-6.63) (10.15) (-10.33) (-6.64)
N 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700 46,700
R¯2 0.33 0.61 0.70 0.33 0.61 0.70 0.33 0.61 0.70
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not statistically significant, suggesting that the extent of customer concentration varies with
the composition of investor clienteles with different investment horizons, but not with the
overall level of institutional ownership.
We then use two alternative measures for customer concentration: the sum of squared
sales percentages to major customers in columns 4-6, and the largest sales percentage to
a major customer in columns 7-9. Using the alternative definitions of customer concentra-
tion, we find consistent results. The coefficients on customer concentration are positive and
significantly significant in columns 4 and 7, where the short-term institutional ownership is
the dependent variable, and negative and statistically significant in columns 5 and 8, where
the long-term institutional ownership is the dependent variable. One standard-deviation
increase in the sales to the largest customer is associated with a 5% increase in short-term
but a 3% decrease in long-term institutional ownership relative to the sample median. As
shown in columns 6 and 9, the effect of customer concentration is not significant on the total
institutional ownership.
In Table 2-2, most of the coefficients on control variables are statistically significant.
We see that short-term and long-term institutional investors share some common favorite
firm characteristics. Both short-term and long-term institutional investors prefer stocks of
firms with a low Tobin’s q and a large market capitalization. They both favor stocks with
low volatility, high turnover, and high price. Although institutions in general prefer high
turnover stocks, the coefficient on turnover in models where short-term ownership is the
dependent variable is three times larger than that in models where long-term ownership is
the dependent variable. The difference is more dramatic in terms of economic significance.
One standard deviation increase in stock turnover is associated with a 40% increase in short-
term ownership, while with a 5% increase in long-term ownership relative to the sample
median. This suggests that short-term institutions are more concerned about stock liquidity
than long-term institutions. Later, we will explore the possibility that stock liquidity is
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the channel through which a concentrated customer base attracts short-term institutional
investors.
Short-term and long-term institutional investors also have very different preferences for
other features. Short-term institutions prefer young firms, while long-term institutions prefer
mature firms. Short-term institutions show a strong preference for stocks with low dividend
payout. For long-term institutions, however, firm payout seems not to be a concern, as the
coefficient is not statistically significant on payout when the dependent variable is long-term
institutional ownership. The preferences for past stock returns are different between short-
term and longterm institutions. The coefficients on past stock returns are positive when
the dependent variable is short-term ownership, but negative when the dependent variable is
long-term ownership. The results suggest that short-term institutions are momentum traders
as they prefer stocks with high past returns, while long-term institutions like those with low
past returns.
Short-term and long-term institutional investors have heterogeneous preferences for cer-
tain firm characteristics, such as firm age, dividend payout, and past stock returns. In this
section, we show that the extent of a firm’s customer base concentration is another firm char-
acteristic that tends to attract different groups of institutional investors, depending upon
their investment horizons. Specifically, short-term institutions would buy the stocks of firms
with a more concentrated customer base. Conversely, long-term institutions would buy the
stocks of firms with a less concentrated customer base.
2.3.2 Alternative samples
Our sample firms are all from Compustat Customer Segment Files, and therefore have at
least one major customer representing 10% or more of their total sales. As a result, our
baseline results are conditional on the fact that all firms have at least one major customer.
To offer more insights on the association between customer concentration and institutional
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ownership, we extend our sample by including firms without any major customer. We
estimate our baseline model by using the following two different samples.
First, we include all firms from the Compustat universe. If a firm does not report any
major customer in Compustat Customer Segment Files, none of its customers accounts
for more than 10% of its total sales. We then set each of our three measures of customer
concentration to zero. Second, instead of using all firms from Compustat universe, we choose
a matched sample. Specifically, for each supplier that discloses at least one major customer
that accounts for at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales, we choose a matched firm with
no major customer outside the Compustat Customer Segment Files based on 2-digit SIC
industry, year, size, and book-to-market. Specifically, we start from the same industry and
year. For each firm in our main sample, we then require a matched firm to fall within the
range between 90% and 110% for both size and book-to-market. Finally, we keep the closest
match based on firm size if we find multiple matches.
Table 2-3 presents the regression results based on the two alternative samples. In Panel
A, the sample size is three times as large as our main sample when we include all firms
from the Compustat universe. Across all three measures of customer concentration, we
still have a positive relationship between short-term institutional ownership and customer
concentration, and a negative relationship between long-term institutional ownership and
customer concentration. All coefficients are statistically significant. As in our main sample,
there is no statistically significant effect of customer concentration on the total institutional
ownership. Panel B presents estimates based on the matched sample. We have consistent
results.
Taken together, we find that customer concentration is associated with the ownership
structure of institutional investors who have different investment horizons. Though a con-
centrated customer base has no effect on the level of total institutional ownership, it is
strongly associated with more short-term, but less long-term institutional ownership. The
65
Table 2-3
Investor Clienteles and Customer Concentration: Alternative Samples
This table presents results from our baseline OLS regressions on two alternative samples. In Panel A, we include all firms from Compustat from 1980 to
2015. In Panel B, we use a matched sample. For each firm in our main sample, we find a matched firm outside Compustat Customer Segment Files based
on industry, year, size, and book-to-market. For both samples, we estimate the following model:
Inst%i,t = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (Total%), Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures
for customer base concentration: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, and Xi,t includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q,
Size, Age, Payout, Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed
effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year.
Panel A: Firms with and without Major Customers
ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total %
Total Customer Sales 0.005** -0.007*** -0.003
(2.63) (-3.37) (-0.56)
Customer HHI 0.007** -0.011*** -0.004
(2.54) (-3.57) (-0.59)
Largest Customer 0.004* -0.010*** -0.008
(2.02) (-3.72) (-1.23)
q -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.018*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.018***
(-12.67) (-10.35) (-15.06) (-12.69) (-10.37) (-15.07) (-12.64) (-10.35) (-15.03)
Size 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.010*** 0.023*** 0.062***
(10.28) (18.30) (33.02) (10.24) (18.40) (33.05) (10.23) (18.36) (32.99)
Age -0.011*** 0.018*** -0.007* -0.011*** 0.018*** -0.007* -0.011*** 0.018*** -0.007*
(-7.15) (11.35) (-1.70) (-7.16) (11.36) (-1.69) (-7.15) (11.35) (-1.70)
Payout -0.428*** 0.108 -0.979*** -0.429*** 0.109 -0.979*** -0.429*** 0.108 -0.980***
(-7.41) (1.38) (-6.24) (-7.42) (1.40) (-6.23) (-7.41) (1.39) (-6.23)
Volatility -0.016* -0.085*** -0.235*** -0.016 -0.085*** -0.235*** -0.015 -0.085*** -0.234***
(-1.69) (-7.18) (-7.90) (-1.69) (-7.20) (-7.90) (-1.68) (-7.18) (-7.90)
Turnover 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.030*** 0.014*** 0.003*** 0.030***
(15.33) (3.38) (10.75) (15.36) (3.35) (10.74) (15.35) (3.37) (10.75)
Price 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.054*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.054*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.054***
(7.19) (6.97) (10.51) (7.19) (6.97) (10.50) (7.19) (6.97) (10.51)
Return−3,0 0.010*** -0.022*** -0.038*** 0.010*** -0.022*** -0.038*** 0.010*** -0.022*** -0.038***
(5.02) (-7.56) (-6.72) (5.02) (-7.57) (-6.72) (5.02) (-7.56) (-6.72)
Return−12,−3 0.011*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 0.011*** -0.018*** -0.021*** 0.011*** -0.018*** -0.021***
(12.09) (-11.39) (-7.78) (12.06) (-11.39) (-7.79) (12.07) (-11.38) (-7.78)
N 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762 113,762
R¯2 0.30 0.61 0.68 0.30 0.61 0.68 0.30 0.61 0.68
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Table 2-3 - Continued
Investor Clienteles and Customer Concentration: Alternative Samples
Panel B: A Matched Sample
ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total %
Total Customer Sales 0.009*** -0.006** 0.002
(4.35) (-2.13) (0.33)
Customer HHI 0.016*** -0.009** 0.009
(4.43) (-2.18) (1.02)
Largest Customer 0.012*** -0.009** 0.001
(4.18) (-2.46) (0.19)
q -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.023*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.023*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.023***
(-6.99) (-8.21) (-12.44) (-7.09) (-8.18) (-12.44) (-7.02) (-8.21) (-12.43)
Size 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.072*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.072*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.072***
(9.24) (14.01) (30.57) (9.30) (14.04) (30.61) (9.25) (14.03) (30.60)
Age -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.010* -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.010* -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.010*
(-6.92) (8.61) (-2.03) (-6.95) (8.61) (-2.01) (-6.92) (8.60) (-2.03)
Payout -0.612*** -0.005 -1.537*** -0.615*** -0.003 -1.537*** -0.614*** -0.004 -1.538***
(-8.82) (-0.05) (-7.27) (-8.85) (-0.03) (-7.25) (-8.84) (-0.04) (-7.26)
Volatility -0.021 -0.109*** -0.315*** -0.020 -0.109*** -0.315*** -0.020 -0.109*** -0.315***
(-1.54) (-6.32) (-7.44) (-1.52) (-6.36) (-7.46) (-1.52) (-6.34) (-7.46)
Turnover 0.013*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.000 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.000 0.022***
(13.57) (0.43) (8.82) (13.57) (0.39) (8.78) (13.58) (0.43) (8.80)
Price 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.068*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.068*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.068***
(4.71) (10.03) (14.96) (4.69) (10.03) (14.95) (4.71) (10.04) (14.96)
Return−3,0 0.015*** -0.018*** -0.033*** 0.015*** -0.018*** -0.032*** 0.015*** -0.018*** -0.033***
(6.19) (-6.93) (-5.53) (6.17) (-6.92) (-5.53) (6.18) (-6.93) (-5.53)
Return−12,−3 0.013*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 0.013*** -0.017*** -0.018*** 0.013*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(10.15) (-10.34) (-5.85) (10.11) (-10.35) (-5.84) (10.11) (-10.34) (-5.85)
N 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868 44,868
R¯2 0.29 0.61 0.68 0.29 0.61 0.68 0.29 0.61 0.68
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results are robust when we include firms that do not have any major customer into the
sample.
2.4 Instrumental variables regressions
Our baseline results point to an economically and statistically significant relationship be-
tween a firm’s customer concentration and the investment horizon of its institutional in-
vestors. One interpretation of this link is that a concentrated customer base attracts short-
term, but deters long-term institutional investors. It is possible, however, that managers
actively pursue large customers under the pressure from short-term institutional investors,
and this decision would be beneficial in the short run, but detrimental to the firm in the
long run. Moreover, some omitted characteristics could affect both institutional ownership
and customer concentration, and hence drive the observed relationship. To address these
endogeneity concerns, we implement instrumental variables regressions using the following
two different instrumental variables.
2.4.1 Customer industry M&A intensity
We need to estimate the effect of an exogenous shock to customer base concentration on
institutional ownership. Our first identification strategy is to use merger and acquisition
activity in customer industries as a source of exogenous variation in customer concentration,
following Campello and Gao (2017). They show that sales to a major customer increase
substantially after that customer conducts a horizontal merger within its industry. The
customer industry consolidation potentially provides customers a stronger buying power,
and therefore increases the supplier’s customer concentration.
Our identification assumption is that the merger and acquisition activity in a customer’s
industry is exogenous to the ownership structure of the supplier firm, except through its
effect on the supplier’s customer base concentration. That is, the M&A activity in a cus-
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tomer’s industry should not directly affect the short-term/long-term institutional ownership
of the supplier. Rather its effect on institutional ownership only exists through its effect on
customer concentration.
Our empirical procedure is based on a two-stage least-squares estimation. In the first
stage, a supplier’s customer concentration is a function of M&A intensity in its customer
industries. The second stage tests the effect of instrumented customer concentration on
institutional ownership. Formally, we estimate the following two-stage model:
Customer Concentrationi,t = β0 + β1Customer Industry M&Ai,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
Inst%i,t = γ0 + γ1Customer Concentrationi,t + γ2Xi,t + ηi,t
(4)
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (To-
tal%), Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base concentra-
tion defined in section 2, Customer Industry M&Ai,t represents the average industry M&A
intensity across industries to which supplier i’s major customers belong, and Xi,t includes
the same set of control variables in Eq. (3).
We obtain the firm-level M&A costs from Compustat (Item AQC). The industry M&A
intensity is measured as the aggregate M&A costs divided by the aggregate sales over all
firms within an industry (2-digit SIC) in a year, and it is averaged over the last five years.
For each supplier, the instrumental variable Customer Industry M&Ai,t is the weighted
average customer industry M&A intensity over all its customer industries, and the weights
are determined by sales percentages derived from individual major customers.
Table 2-4 presents the two-stage least-squares estimates of institutional ownership on
customer concentration. In columns 1, 5 and 9, we report the first-stage coefficient estimate
of customer concentration on customer industry M&A intensity for three customer concen-
tration measures, respectively. Across all three measures, the coefficient on the average
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Table 2-4
Instrumental Variables Regressions: Customer Industry M&A
This table presents results from two-stage instrumental variables regressions. We estimate the following models:
Customer Concentrationi,t = β0 + β1Customer Industry M&Ai,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
Inst%i,t = γ0 + γ1Customer Concentrationi,t + γ2Xi,t + ηi,t
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (Total%), Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures
for customer base concentration: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, Customer Industry M&Ai,t represents the average industry
M&A intensity across industries to which supplier i’s major customers belong, and Xi,t includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Payout,
Volatility, Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry
classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer
reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First-stage ST % LT % Total % First-stage ST % LT % Total % First-stage ST % LT % Total %
Customer Industry 17.459*** 13.102*** 14.283***
M&A (34.16) (29.51) (32.93)
Total Customer Sales 0.023*** -0.016* 0.003
(3.07) (-1.69) (0.12)
Customer HHI 0.030*** -0.022* 0.004
(3.07) (-1.70) (0.12)
Largest Customer 0.028*** -0.020* 0.003
(3.06) (-1.70) (0.12)
q 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.018*** 0.010*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.018***
(5.56) (-6.81) (-10.62) (-12.08) (6.57) (-6.78) (-10.38) (-11.97) (6.71) (-6.79) (-10.45) (-12.01)
Size -0.019*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.061*** -0.008*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.061*** -0.013*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.061***
(-6.02) (9.77) (16.39) (18.90) (-4.38) (9.68) (16.72) (19.06) (-6.24) (9.75) (16.55) (18.96)
Age -0.038*** -0.011*** 0.018*** -0.007 -0.016*** -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.007 -0.020*** -0.012*** 0.018*** -0.007
(-7.22) (-7.34) (8.48) (-1.55) (-5.54) (-7.74) (8.80) (-1.59) (-5.87) (-7.65) (8.74) (-1.58)
Payout 0.480** -0.403*** 0.216** -0.795*** 0.497*** -0.407*** 0.219** -0.795*** 0.605*** -0.409*** 0.220** -0.796***
(2.06) (-6.22) (2.24) (-4.24) (3.49) (-6.31) (2.27) (-4.23) (3.58) (-6.32) (2.28) (-4.22)
Volatility 0.053 -0.022** -0.077*** -0.240*** 0.053** -0.022** -0.077*** -0.240*** 0.037 -0.022** -0.077*** -0.240***
(1.46) (-2.10) (-6.41) (-8.53) (2.27) (-2.14) (-6.39) (-8.51) (1.41) (-2.08) (-6.43) (-8.54)
Turnover 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.028*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.028*** 0.002 0.013*** 0.003*** 0.028***
(2.92) (18.99) (4.16) (14.22) (0.60) (19.20) (4.06) (14.30) (1.43) (19.13) (4.09) (14.28)
Price -0.003 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.056*** -0.006** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.056*** -0.004 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.056***
(-0.70) (8.11) (9.52) (13.10) (-2.26) (8.18) (9.49) (13.09) (-1.35) (8.14) (9.52) (13.10)
Return−3,0 0.008 0.012*** -0.020*** -0.029*** -0.001 0.012*** -0.020*** -0.029*** 0.001 0.012*** -0.020*** -0.029***
(1.27) (6.32) (-9.77) (-6.26) (-0.30) (6.41) (-9.88) (-6.26) (0.32) (6.37) (-9.84) (-6.26)
Return−12,−3 0.008** 0.013*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.003 0.013*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 0.005** 0.013*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(2.56) (12.23) (-18.31) (-8.31) (1.34) (12.27) (-18.48) (-8.32) (2.38) (12.22) (-18.38) (-8.31)
N 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500 19,500
R¯2 0.27 0.23 0.39 0.54 0.34 0.23 0.40 0.53 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.53
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customer industry M&A intensity is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient
is economically significant as well. One standard-deviation increase in a supplier’s average
customer industry M&A intensity leads to an 11% increase in its customer concentration,
measured by the total sales to all major customers.
We report the second-stage estimates of institutional ownership on the instrumented
customer concentration and other control variables in the next three columns following the
first-stage. We regress short-term, long-term, or total institutional ownership on the instru-
mented customer concentration. With the variation in customer concentration stemming
from M&A activities in customer industries, our baseline results still hold. All coefficients
on customer concentration remain positive and statistically significant in models where the
dependent variable is short-term institutional ownership, while negative and statistically
significant in models where the dependent variable is long-term institutional investors. In
terms of economic significance, one standard-deviation increase in customer concentration
leads to a 14% increase in short-term institutional ownership and a 5% decrease in long-term
institutional ownership, each relative to its corresponding sample median. When we replace
the dependent variable with the total institutional ownership, the coefficient on customer
concentration is not statistically significant.
2.4.2 Industry average customer concentration
We use an alternative instrumental variable for customer concentration following Dhaliwal,
Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh (2017). The instrumental variable is the historical industry
average customer concentration. For each of our three measures of customer concentration,
we calculate the two-year lagged industry average in the supplier’s industry based on its
2-digit SIC with the supplier itself excluded. An individual firm’s customer concentration is
correlated with its industry average. But it is less likely that a firm’s institutional ownership
structure is driven by the historical industry average customer concentration, except through
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its effect on the firm’s customer base. The historical industry average customer concentration
is also unlikely to be an outcome of future pressure by institutional investors.
Table 2-5 presents the two-stage least-squares estimates. The first-stage estimate is pos-
itive and statistically significant across all three proxies of customer concentration. The
second-stage estimates confirm that the customer concentration attracts different groups
of institutional investors, depending on their investment horizons. The coefficients on the
instrumented customer concentration are positive and statistically significant when the de-
pendent variable is short-term ownership, but negative and statistically significant when the
dependent variable is long-term ownership. As the customer base concentration increases,
firms become more attractive to short-term institutional investors, but less attractive to long-
term institutional investors. The coefficients on customer concentration when the dependent
variable is total institutional ownership is not statistically significant.
Taken together, our results of instrumental variables regressions support a causal effect of
customer concentration on the institutional ownership structure after controlling for potential
endogeneity issues. Though it has no effect on total institutional ownership, a concentrated
customer base appears to attract short-term, but deters long-term institutional investors.
2.5 Mechanisms
In this section, we turn to exploring possible economic channels behind the heterogeneous
preferences of different clienteles towards firms with a concentrated customer base. Specifi-
cally, we ask how a concentrated customer base attracts short-term institutional investors,
but deters long-term institutional investors. As follows, we will discuss information transfer
along the supply chain, risks associated with customer concentration, and stock liquidity.
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Table 2-5
Instrumental Variables Regressions: Supplier Industry Averages
This table presents results from two-stage instrumental variables regressions. We estimate the following models:
Customer Concentrationi,t = β0 + β1Supplier Industry Averagei,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
Inst%i,t = γ0 + γ1Customer Concentrationi,t + γ2Xi,t + ηi,t
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (Total%), Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures
for customer base concentration: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, Supplier Industry Averagei,t is the average customer
concentration measure in the supplier’s 2-digit SIC industry, and Xi,t includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Payout, Volatility, Turnover,
Price, and Returns. All variables are defined in Appendix C. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least
one major customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
First-stage ST % LT % Total % First-stage ST % LT % Total % First-stage ST % LT % Total %
Industry Average 0.742*** 0.708*** 0.673***
(20.62) (17.62) (17.43)
Total Customer Sales 0.027*** -0.020* 0.033
(2.90) (-1.68) (1.18)
Customer HHI 0.029** -0.048*** 0.002
(2.12) (-2.69) (0.04)
Largest Customer 0.035** -0.054*** 0.012
(2.33) (-2.66) (0.24)
q 0.013*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.022*** 0.014*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.021*** 0.013*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.021***
(8.06) (-13.52) (-18.18) (-20.91) (9.55) (-12.39) (-15.09) (-18.37) (10.29) (-12.33) (-14.49) (-18.00)
Size -0.019*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.072*** -0.012*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.071*** -0.013*** 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.071***
(-5.96) (21.70) (28.37) (34.60) (-5.41) (21.63) (27.98) (34.25) (-6.05) (21.59) (27.59) (33.97)
Age -0.026*** -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.004 -0.017*** -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.005 -0.016*** -0.011*** 0.017*** -0.004
(-5.02) (-10.02) (12.11) (-1.09) (-4.75) (-10.25) (11.91) (-1.35) (-4.78) (-10.09) (11.77) (-1.29)
Payout -0.052 -0.528*** 0.089 -1.200*** 0.165 -0.538*** 0.096 -1.214*** 0.153 -0.538*** 0.096 -1.213***
(-0.26) (-12.67) (1.38) (-8.62) (1.17) (-12.90) (1.48) (-8.67) (1.06) (-12.91) (1.48) (-8.68)
Volatility 0.097*** -0.035*** -0.067*** -0.229*** 0.067*** -0.035*** -0.066*** -0.226*** 0.070*** -0.035*** -0.065*** -0.226***
(3.42) (-5.83) (-9.22) (-13.33) (3.13) (-5.73) (-8.94) (-13.11) (3.40) (-5.79) (-8.79) (-13.09)
Turnover 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.024*** 0.002* 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.024***
(2.64) (24.15) (6.85) (18.71) (0.87) (24.46) (6.77) (18.87) (1.67) (24.33) (6.85) (18.81)
Price 0.005 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.047*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.047*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.047***
(1.19) (10.82) (12.66) (17.41) (0.77) (10.84) (12.67) (17.44) (0.44) (10.86) (12.59) (17.42)
Return−3,0 0.000 0.008*** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.003 0.008*** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.003 0.008*** -0.020*** -0.036***
(0.08) (6.96) (-15.80) (-12.11) (-0.72) (7.01) (-15.94) (-12.20) (-0.72) (7.01) (-15.89) (-12.17)
Return−12,−3 -0.002 0.011*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.003* 0.011*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.003* 0.011*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(-0.86) (16.48) (-25.34) (-11.50) (-1.79) (16.44) (-25.19) (-11.52) (-1.65) (16.44) (-25.14) (-11.48)
N 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693 45,693
R¯2 0.10 0.32 0.60 0.69 0.09 0.32 0.60 0.69 0.08 0.32 0.60 0.69
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2.5.1 Information along the supply chain
Existing literature (see, for example, Yan and Zhang, 2009) demonstrates that short-term
institutions are better informed and have the ability to exploit informational advantage
through trading strategies that lead to abnormal returns. If customer concentration base can
generate abnormal stock performance due to the segmentation effect and slow information
transfer along the supply chain (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Menzly and Ozbaz, 2010), this
mechanism would explain the larger share of holdings by short-term investors. We test this
mechanism in the following two ways.
Average customer performance
First, short-term institutional investors presumably are more sensitive than others to the
information through the supply chain, which provides them abnormal returns when stock
prices fully incorporate the information. If this is the case, we expect the effect of customer
concentration on short-term ownership to be stronger when major customers are more prof-
itable and more dominant in their own industries. To examine this potential channel, we
adjust our concentration measures based on the performance of individual customers as fol-
lows:
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Customer Market Sharei,t =
k∑
c=1
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
×Market Sharec,t
Customer ROAi,t =
k∑
c=1
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
×ROAc,t
Customer Sales Growthi,t =
k∑
c=1
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
× Sales Growthc,t
Customer Stock Returni,t =
k∑
c=1
Salesi,c,t
Salesi,t
× Stock Returnc,t
where Salesi,t represents the total sales of supplier i in year t, Salesi,c,t represents supplier
i’s sales to its major customer c in year t, Market Sharec,t is customer c’s total sales divided
by aggregate sales in its industry (2-digit SIC) in year t, ROAc,t is customer c’s ROA in year
t, Sales Growthc,t is customer c’s sales growth rate in year t, Stock Returnc,t is customer
c’s cumulative stock return in year t, and k is the number of major customers of supplier i
in year t.
These measures are very close to our first customer concentration measure, but adjusted
for customer performance. They capture both customer concentration and customer perfor-
mance. If short-term institutional investors have an information advantage along the supply
chain, we would expect that a supplier is more attractive to them if its major customers per-
form better. We estimate our baseline model Eq. (3) and replace our customer concentration
measures with performance-adjusted ones.
Table 2-6 presents the regression results. All coefficients on customer performance are sta-
tistically insignificant in models where the dependent variable is the short-term institutional
ownership. Short-term institutional investors are not attracted by a stronger customer
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Table 2-6
Investor Clienteles and Customer Performance
This table presents results from regressions of institutional ownership on customer performance. We estimate the following model:
Inst%i,t = β0 + β1Customer Perfomancei,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
where Inst%i,t is short-term (ST%), long-term (LT%), or total institutional ownership (Total%), Customer Perfomancei,t is Customer Market Share,
Customer ROA, Customer Sales Growth, or Customer Stock Return, and Xi,t includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Payout, Volatility,
Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications
are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in
Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total % ST % LT % Total %
Customer Market Share -0.001 -0.018 -0.023
(-0.05) (-0.52) (-0.31)
Customer Sales Growth 0.001 -0.011** -0.022**
(0.17) (-2.67) (-2.19)
Customer ROA 0.031 -0.091* -0.006
(1.05) (-1.96) (-0.07)
Customer Stock Return 0.006 -0.017** -0.011
(0.96) (-2.45) (-0.77)
q -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.008*** -0.020***
(-5.46) (-7.93) (-9.11) (-5.89) (-7.92) (-9.10) (-5.51) (-7.77) (-9.03) (-5.94) (-7.73) (-8.62)
Size 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 0.062***
(5.91) (12.86) (17.77) (6.05) (12.66) (17.65) (5.95) (12.81) (17.77) (6.30) (12.71) (17.53)
Age -0.012*** 0.017*** -0.010 -0.012*** 0.016*** -0.011 -0.012*** 0.016*** -0.010 -0.012*** 0.017*** -0.008
(-5.55) (6.37) (-1.39) (-5.75) (6.07) (-1.56) (-5.57) (6.28) (-1.40) (-5.15) (6.30) (-1.12)
Payout -0.392*** 0.183 -0.946*** -0.369*** 0.189 -0.908*** -0.392*** 0.181 -0.950*** -0.409*** 0.145 -1.005***
(-4.47) (1.59) (-3.65) (-4.25) (1.62) (-3.43) (-4.49) (1.56) (-3.66) (-4.56) (1.23) (-3.74)
Volatility -0.019 -0.087*** -0.246*** -0.018 -0.086*** -0.243*** -0.019 -0.087*** -0.246*** -0.011 -0.089*** -0.241***
(-1.46) (-5.13) (-6.55) (-1.45) (-4.94) (-6.40) (-1.46) (-5.12) (-6.55) (-0.88) (-5.39) (-6.19)
Turnover 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.030*** 0.013*** 0.004*** 0.031***
(13.66) (3.50) (9.79) (13.53) (3.80) (10.23) (13.69) (3.53) (9.80) (13.17) (3.80) (9.76)
Price 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.060*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.060*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.060*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.059***
(4.57) (6.81) (9.49) (4.40) (6.86) (9.44) (4.57) (6.84) (9.50) (4.94) (6.55) (9.25)
Return−3,0 0.011*** -0.020*** -0.031*** 0.012*** -0.021*** -0.032*** 0.011*** -0.020*** -0.031*** 0.011*** -0.020*** -0.031***
(4.36) (-6.33) (-4.27) (4.48) (-6.53) (-4.49) (4.38) (-6.31) (-4.28) (3.69) (-5.77) (-4.13)
Return−12,−3 0.011*** -0.019*** -0.023*** 0.011*** -0.019*** -0.023*** 0.011*** -0.019*** -0.023*** 0.012*** -0.019*** -0.022***
(6.94) (-10.02) (-5.79) (7.15) (-10.07) (-5.70) (6.98) (-9.94) (-5.82) (7.34) (-8.94) (-5.62)
N 17,693 17,693 17,693 17,399 17,399 17,399 17,693 17,693 17,693 16,242 16,242 16,242
R¯2 0.29 0.60 0.68 0.29 0.60 0.68 0.29 0.60 0.68 0.30 0.60 0.68
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performance. Interestingly, coefficients on customer performance are negative and statisti-
cally significant in models where the dependent variable is long-term institutional ownership.
It could be due to the fall of profit margin when dealing with dominant and profitable major
customers. We will later discuss the risk associated with customer concentration and the
preference of long-term institutional investors.
Portfolio returns
Second, if short-term institutional investors have informational advantage regarding the
customer base, then they would be able to earn abnormal returns by holding stocks of firms
with more concentrated customer base. To directly test this mechanism, we conduct a stan-
dard asset pricing test by forming portfolios based on firms’ customer concentration.
We sort firms into five quintile portfolios ranked on customer concentration every year
at the end of June. The customer information is from the most recent reporting date before
each June end. Firms in quintile 1 have the lowest level of customer concentration, while
firms in quintile 5 have the highest level of customer concentration. Within each quintile
portfolio, we equal or value weight the stocks to form one time-series of monthly returns. The
returns of a long-short portfolio are portfolio returns of quintile 5 minus those of quintile 1.
We regress monthly returns of each portfolio on two sets of risk factors, Fama-French three
factors plus momentum and Fama-French five factors.
Table 2-7 presents raw returns and time-series alphas from regressions of monthly port-
folio returns on risk factors. We report results for both equal-weighted and value-weighted
portfolio returns. In the first column, ranks 1-5 refer to monthly returns of each quintile
portfolio from the least concentrated portfolio 1 to the most concentrated portfolio 5. The
last row 5-1 refers to the difference in monthly returns between portfolios 5 and 1. The
average monthly raw return is 0.7% for portfolio 5, and 1.2% for portfolio 1. The difference
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Table 2-7
Portfolios Sorted by Customer Concentration
This table presents value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio monthly returns and alphas. We
sort firms into five quintile portfolios based on customer concentration every year at the end of June.
The customer concentration is measured as the total sales to all major customers at the most recent
fiscal year-end before June. Firms in the quintile 1 have the lowest level of customer concentration,
while firms in quintile 5 have the highest level of customer concentration. We rebalance portfolios
every 12 months. Row 1 to 5 refers to monthly returns of each quintile portfolio. The last row 5-1
refers to the difference in monthly returns between portfolio 5 and 1. We regress monthly returns of
each portfolio on either Fama-French three factors plus momentum or Fama-French five factors. For
each portfolio, we report the average raw return and alphas. The sample includes all firms that have
at least one major customer reported in Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
Rank N Mean FF-3 + Mom FF-5 Mean FF-3 + Mom FF-5
1 414 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.004*** 0.003**
(1.50) (0.83) (3.60) (2.13)
2 414 0.010 -0.000 0.001 0.012 0.003** 0.002
(-0.00) (0.78) (2.11) (1.33)
3 414 0.009 -0.000 0.002 0.012 0.003* 0.002
(-0.05) (1.54) (1.89) (1.36)
4 414 0.008 -0.001 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.001
(-0.49) (0.11) (0.67) (0.31)
5 414 0.007 -0.003* -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.001
(-1.91) (-0.51) (0.33) (0.57)
5-1 414 -0.005 -0.005** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003** -0.002
(-1.10) (-2.53) (-0.99) (-0.85) (-2.39) (-1.18)
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between the two is not significant. Alpha is only statistically significant for the most concen-
trated portfolio when we regress value-weighted returns on Fama-French three factors plus
momentum, but it is negative. The long-short portfolio has a significant alpha based on
the four factor model, but it is still negative. Firms with higher customer concentration do
not have either higher raw returns or higher excess stock returns after controlling for risk
factors than firms with low customer concentration. This finding suggests that customer
concentration does not contain profitable information for short-term institutional investors
to trade on.
In summary, results in this section suggest that the information transfer along the sup-
ply chain is not likely the channel through which customer concentration attracts short-term
institutional investors. The effect of customer concentration on short-term ownership is not
enhanced by the performance of customers. In addition, stocks of firms with a more concen-
trated customer base do not have a higher stock return than firms with a less concentrated
customer base.
2.5.2 Risk
Existing literature provides ample evidence that customer concentration increases the long-
term risk profile of a firm. Starting from Titman (1984) who has formally outlined the link
between specificity of a firm sales and bankruptcy risk, a number of subsequent empirical
papers have supported this argument in the context of customer concentration. Campello
and Gao (2017) find a positive and significant relation between the significance of major cus-
tomers and loan failure rates. Moreover, they show that customer concentration reduces loan
duration, consistent with the long-term risk argument. Wang (2008) explores the link be-
tween customer concentration and payout policy and finds evidence in support of the distress
risk. Dhaliwal (2016) shows that higher firm risk is embedded in the cost of equity capital.
Finally, firms are facing a trade off between the benefits of reducing information asymmetry
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and the costs of aiding competitors by disclosing information of major customers (Ellis, Fee,
and Thomas, 2012). Firms have to disclose major customers required by regulations, but at
the same time they risk losing their competitive edge.
Institutional investors with long investment horizon and low portfolio turnover prefer
firms with low bankruptcy risk and high financial stability. The increased risk associated with
a supplier’s dependency on few large customers could explain why long-term institutional
investors are less inclined to invest in these firms. However, this risk is not necessarily a
concern for short-term institutional investors given their short-term trading strategies. We
then turn to the next section to explore the reason why they prefer investing in firms with
a concentrated customer base.
2.5.3 Stock liquidity
Increased stock liquidity and customer concentration
Both short-term and long-term institutional investors favor liquidity. Apparently, short-
term investors demand liquidity because of their short-term trading strategies. For long-term
investors, liquid stocks provide them with more monitoring power because the threat of exit
comes from the ease of liquidating their positions (see Edmans, 2009). In Table 2-2, the
coefficient on stock turnover is positive and statistically significant in all models. It is 0.012
in models where short-term institutional ownership is the dependent variable, three times
larger than that where long-term institutional ownership is the dependent variable. One
standard-deviation increase in stock turnover ratio increases short-term institutional own-
ership by 41%, while increases long-term institutional ownership by 5% relative to their
corresponding sample median values. The sharp difference indicates that short-term institu-
tional investors are more concerned about liquidity than long-term investors. In this section,
we examine whether stock liquidity is a channel through which a concentrated customer
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base attracts short-term investors. Customer concentration can improve a supplier’s stock
liquidity through several mechanisms.
First, securing a contract with a large customer is an important event in the life of a
supplier firm, which is reported in company announcements, annual reports, and potentially
media sources. As a result, a supplier, typically a relatively small firm compared to the over-
all universe of publicly-traded firms, becomes more visible to market participants, thereby
increasing trading volume in the stock.
Second, both theoretical and empirical studies document that greater public disclosure
reduces information asymmetry and improves stock liquidity 15. A concentrated customer
base is likely to reduce information asymmetry through disclosure. As required by regula-
tions, a supplier must disclose information of major customers who account for 10% or more
of its total sales. With no customer above the threshold, a firm does not have to disclose,
although they could still disclose voluntarily. Investors demand information on a firm’s cus-
tomer base, because they can access risks inherent in sales (see Ellis, Fee, and Thomas, 2012;
Patatoukas, 2012), and evaluate a firm’s investments, as the dependency on a few major cus-
tomers is associated with relationship-specific investments (see Titman and Wessels, 1988;
Kale and Shahrur, 2007). Besides, major customers also influence information disclosure.
Hui, Klasa, and Yeung (2012) find that customers demand accounting conservatism to limit
risk. Samuels (2016) finds that contracting with government improves the supplier’s external
reporting.
To determine whether customer concentration improves future stock liquidity, we regress
future liquidity on customer concentration, controlling the current level of liquidity and other
stock characteristics.
15In a theoretical study, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) shows that public disclosure improves future
liquidity and attracts large institutional investors. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) find survey evidence
that managers voluntarily disclose information to reduce the information risk that investors assign to our
stock. Empirically, Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist (2014) find that managers disclose more
earnings guidance to improve liquidity and firm value when facing an exogenous loss of public information.
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Liquidityi,t+1 = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Liquidityi,t + β3Xi,t + i,t (5)
where Liquidityi,t+1 is either monthly stock turnover or monthly illiquidity (Amihud, 2002)
at the end of year t+1, Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer
base concentration defined in section 2, and Xi,t is a set of stock characteristics as control
variables, including book-to-market, size, payout, volatility, the log of stock price, and past
stock return.
Table 2-8 Panel A presents the OLS regression results. In the first three columns where
the liquidity is measured by stock turnover, the coefficient on customer concentration is
positive and statistically significant. In the last three columns, the liquidity is measured by
Amihud’s illiquidity, and the coefficient on customer concentration is negative and statisti-
cally significant. The results support that a more concentrated customer base is associated
with higher future stock liquidity.
As in the previous section, we also test this effect of customer concentration on future
liquidity based on the exogenous variation in customer concentration stemming from the
customer industry M&A intensity. Panel B presents the estimates from instrumental vari-
ables regressions. Consistent with our OLS results in Panel A, all instrumented customer
concentration measures are positively correlated with stock liquidity, and all coefficients are
statistically significant. In the first column, one standard-deviation in the total sales to all
major customers is associated with a 10% increase in the future stock turnover relative to
the sample median. The IV results support the view that customer concentration leads to
higher future stock liquidity.
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Table 2-8
Stock Liquidity and Customer Concentration
This table presents results from regressions of future stock liquidity on customer concentration.
In Panel A, we estimate the following model:
Liquidityi,t+1 = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Liquidityi,t + β3Xi,t + i,t
where Liquidityi,t+1 is either monthly stock turnover or monthly illiquidity at the end of year
t+ 1, Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base concentration:
Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, and Xi,t includes a set of firm
characteristics: Book-to-Market, Size, Payout, Volatility, Price, and Stock Return. In Panel
B, we instrument each customer concentration measure by Customer Industry M&A, measured
as the average industry M&A intensity across industries to which supplier i’s major customers
belong. All variables are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year
fixed effects. Industry classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by
firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in
Compustat Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Panel A: OLS
Turnovert+1 Illiquidityt+1
Total Customer Sales 0.128*** -0.055***
(2.89) (-3.08)
Customer HHI 0.156*** -0.089***
(2.85) (-3.60)
Largest Customer 0.116** -0.078***
(2.41) (-3.23)
Turnovert 0.459*** 0.459*** 0.460***
(23.50) (23.65) (23.67)
Illiquidityt 0.546*** 0.546*** 0.546***
(24.20) (24.19) (24.16)
Book-to-Market 0.022 0.022 0.021 -0.031* -0.031** -0.031**
(1.59) (1.59) (1.53) (-2.01) (-2.05) (-2.04)
Size 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.150*** -0.144*** -0.143*** -0.143***
(8.99) (8.93) (8.91) (-10.07) (-10.08) (-10.06)
Payout -6.492*** -6.524*** -6.525*** -0.100 -0.084 -0.085
(-8.93) (-8.95) (-8.95) (-0.20) (-0.16) (-0.17)
Volatility 0.973*** 0.976*** 0.983*** -0.130 -0.129 -0.131
(4.60) (4.58) (4.61) (-1.02) (-1.01) (-1.03)
Price -0.044** -0.044* -0.044** -0.030* -0.030* -0.030*
(-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.05) (-1.75) (-1.78) (-1.77)
Stock Return -0.039** -0.039** -0.039** 0.013* 0.013* 0.013*
(-2.08) (-2.07) (-2.07) (1.85) (1.85) (1.85)
N 34,988 34,988 34,988 39,080 39,080 39,080
R¯2 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.54 0.54 0.54
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Table 2-8 - Continued
Stock Liquidity and Customer Concentration
Panel B: IV
Turnovert+1 Illiquidityt+1
Total Customer Sales 0.245** -0.229***
(2.46) (-5.33)
Customer HHI 0.333** -0.309***
(2.46) (-5.35)
Largest Customer 0.305** -0.283***
(2.45) (-5.32)
Turnovert 0.484*** 0.486*** 0.486***
(31.72) (31.93) (31.88)
Illiquidityt 0.590*** 0.590*** 0.590***
(40.08) (40.13) (40.13)
Book-to-Market 0.028 0.029 0.029 -0.041** -0.042*** -0.042***
(1.37) (1.41) (1.41) (-2.54) (-2.60) (-2.61)
Size 0.143*** 0.141*** 0.143*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.114***
(12.24) (12.34) (12.30) (-17.04) (-16.98) (-17.05)
Payout -5.657*** -5.730*** -5.748*** 0.233 0.324 0.331
(-8.75) (-8.87) (-8.88) (0.47) (0.66) (0.67)
Volatility 1.358*** 1.363*** 1.370*** -0.255** -0.264** -0.268***
(7.02) (7.05) (7.11) (-2.44) (-2.54) (-2.59)
Price -0.031* -0.029* -0.030* -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(-1.75) (-1.66) (-1.71) (-3.72) (-3.87) (-3.79)
Stock Return -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001
(-0.23) (-0.21) (-0.23) (0.12) (0.04) (0.10)
N 13,869 13,869 13,869 18,118 18,118 18,118
R¯2 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.56 0.56 0.56
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Firms with few short-term institutional investors
The increased future stock liquidity associated with customer concentration could also
be a result of the active trading of short-term institutional investors, and these investors
might be attracted by a concentrated customer base for reasons other than liquidity. If it
is the case, then the relation between customer concentration and liquidity would be much
weaker for firms owned by few short-term institutional investors. To mitigate this concern,
we sort firms into three tercile groups based on their short-term institutional ownership. To
see how different firms owned by few short-term institutional investors are from the rest,
we compare firms in the bottom tercile (ST% Tercile 1) with the rest of the firms (ST%
Terciles 2 and 3). For firms in ST% Tercile 1, the short-term institutional ownership is less
than 1.36% in our sample. We estimate Eq. (5) using both samples and report the results
in Table 2-9. The dependent variable is monthly stock turnover at the end of the next year.
Across all models, the coefficient on customer concentration is always positive and statis-
tically significant. More importantly, the correlation between customer concentration and
future liquidity is not weaker for firms with few short-term institutional investors. Instead,
it is very close to that for the rest of the firms. In the first column, one standard deviation
increase in the total sales to all major customers is associated with a 10% increase in future
stock turnover for firms in ST% tercile 1.
Admittedly, the active trading by short-term institutional investors could contribute to
stock liquidity. But for firms with very few short-term institutional investors, the impact of
their active trading on liquidity should be limited. However, in these firms we still find that
future stock turnover strongly increases in customer concentration. Thus, it is less likely
that customer concentration increases stock liquidity only through short-term institutional
investors’ trading. Instead, our results support the hypothesis that increased liquidity is a
channel through which customer concentration attracts short-term institutional investors.
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Table 2-9
Stock Liquidity and Customer Concentration: Subsamples
This table presents results from regressions of future stock liquidity on customer concentration.
We sort firms into three terciles based on their short-term institutional ownership. Firms in the
bottom tercile have the lowest short-term ownership. We estimate the following model on the
bottom tercile and the rest, respectively:
Liquidityi,t+1 = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Liquidityi,t + β3Xi,t + i,t
where Liquidityi,t+1 is monthly stock turnover at the end of year t + 1,
Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base concentration:
Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, and Xi,t includes a set of firm
characteristics: Book-to-Market, Size, Payout, Volatility, Price, and Stock Return. All variables
are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry
classifications are based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The
sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in Compustat Customer
Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
Turnovert+1
ST % Tercile 1 2&3 1 2&3 1 2&3
Total Customer Sales 0.128*** 0.139**
(2.91) (2.62)
Customer HHI 0.189*** 0.174**
(2.77) (2.35)
Largest Customer 0.126** 0.146**
(2.28) (2.20)
Turnovert 0.329*** 0.464*** 0.329*** 0.464*** 0.330*** 0.464***
(7.08) (25.47) (7.09) (25.62) (7.09) (25.65)
Book-to-Market -0.007 0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.004
(-0.34) (0.20) (-0.31) (0.25) (-0.36) (0.21)
Size 0.068*** 0.150*** 0.068*** 0.149*** 0.068*** 0.149***
(4.15) (7.87) (4.07) (7.77) (4.09) (7.74)
Payout -2.956*** -7.348*** -2.996*** -7.380*** -2.990*** -7.382***
(-3.90) (-7.17) (-3.93) (-7.20) (-3.92) (-7.21)
Volatility 0.821*** 1.251*** 0.821*** 1.255*** 0.828*** 1.261***
(4.20) (4.45) (4.15) (4.40) (4.19) (4.43)
Price -0.062*** -0.025 -0.061*** -0.024 -0.062*** -0.024
(-3.18) (-0.71) (-3.12) (-0.69) (-3.19) (-0.69)
Return -0.083*** -0.032 -0.084*** -0.032 -0.083*** -0.032
(-3.80) (-1.27) (-3.86) (-1.26) (-3.85) (-1.26)
N 11,027 23,628 11,027 23,628 11,027 23,628
R¯2 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
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Liquidity preference and customer concentration
To further support the liquidity channel, we turn to the liquidity preference of institu-
tional investors. If liquidity is a channel through which customer concentration attracts
short-term institutional investors, we would expect that customer concentration only at-
tracts short-term institutional investors who indeed favor liquidity. On the other hand, as
shown in our baseline results, long-term institutional investors also like liquidity, although
not as strong as short-term investors do. The increased liquidity associated with customer
concentration should mitigate the risk concern of long-term investors who prefer liquidity as
well.
We proxy the liquidity preference of institutional investors by the average liquidity over
their portfolio holdings. An institutional investor’s portfolio liquidity is measured as the
value-weighted average turnover of all stock holdings in her portfolio. Every quarter, we sort
institutional investors into terciles based on their portfolio liquidity. Institutional investors
in the top tercile hold the most liquid portfolios and are categorized as investors who prefer
liquidity. Institutional investors in the bottom tercile hold the least liquid portfolios and
are categorized as investors who do not prefer liquidity. This sorting is independent of our
investor horizon sorting. By doing so, we can further split either short-term or long-term
investors into those who prefer liquidity and those who do not. To test whether customer
concentration attracts institutional investors who prefer liquidity, we replace the dependent
variable in Eq. (3) with the ownership of one of the following four groups of institutional
investors: short-term institutional investors who prefer liquidity and who do not, and long-
term institutional investors who prefer liquidity and who do not.
Table 2-10 presents the regression results. For each customer concentration measure,
we have four specifications. Each of them uses the ownership of one group of institutional
investors as the dependent variable. All three customer concentration measures show consis-
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tent results. In models where the dependent variable is short-term institutional ownership,
the coefficient on customer concentration is positive and statically significant. However, the
coefficient is close to zero for short-term investors who hold the least liquid portfolios. One
standard-deviation in the total sales to major customers is associated with an 7.5% increase
in the ownership of short-term institutional investors who prefer liquidity relative to the
sample median, but close to zero for those who do not prefer liquidity.
According to our definition, long-term institutional investors hold their position for long
run. But the increased liquidity from a concentrated customer base could be also attractive,
especially for those who prefer liquid stocks. In models where the dependent variable is
long-term institutional ownership, the coefficient on customer concentration is negative and
statistically significant only for long-term institutional investors who do not prefer liquidity.
For those who prefer liquidity, the coefficient is not significant any more. This finding
supports our prediction that customer concentration increases stock liquidity, so it attracts
long-term investors even though they are also concerned about future risks. The insignificant
coefficient could be due to the fact that the benefits from holding liquidity stocks can mitigate
the concern on the risk associated with a concentrated customer base.
Taken together, this section documents that stock liquidity is a channel through which
customer concentration attracts short-term institutional investors. As a result, customer
concentration mainly attracts short-term investors who like holding liquid stocks. For long-
term institutional investors who favor liquidity, the increased stock liquidity also makes firms
with a concentrated customer base more attractive.
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Table 2-10
Liquidity Preference and Customer Concentration
This table presents results from regressions of institutional ownership on customer concentration. We sort institutional investors into terciles based on
their portfolio liquidity, measured as the value-weighted average stock turnover over all holdings. We further divide both short-term and long-term investors
into those who hold the most liquid portfolios in the top tercile and those who hold the least liquid portfolios in the bottom tercile. We estimate the following model:
Inst%i,t = β0 + β1Customer Concentrationi,t + β2Xi,t + i,t
where Inst%i,t is the ownership of each of four types of institutional investors, Customer Concentrationi,t is one of the three measures for customer base
concentration: Total Customer Sales, Customer HHI, and Largest Customer, and Xi,t includes a set of firm characteristics: Tobin’s q, Size, Age, Payout, Volatility,
Turnover, Price, and Returns. All variables are defined in Appendix C. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed effects. Industry classifications are
based on 2-digit SIC. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. The sample includes all firms that have at least one major customer reported in Compustat
Customer Segment Files from 1980 to 2015.
ST % LT % ST % LT % ST % LT %
Portfolio Liquidity High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
Total Customer Sales 0.006*** 0.000* 0.000 -0.002*
(3.09) (1.79) (0.10) (-1.66)
Customer HHI 0.006** 0.001** 0.000 -0.004**
(2.49) (2.47) (0.15) (-2.09)
Largest Customer 0.004* 0.001** -0.000 -0.004**
(1.79) (2.06) (-0.45) (-2.24)
q -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-7.08) (-7.84) (-8.69) (-7.67) (-7.05) (-8.04) (-8.70) (-7.53) (-6.94) (-7.88) (-8.62) (-7.51)
Size 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.007***
(19.21) (9.01) (2.50) (16.84) (19.13) (9.03) (2.50) (16.85) (19.09) (9.01) (2.46) (16.80)
Age -0.009*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.009*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.006*** -0.009*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.006***
(-12.81) (-0.51) (3.30) (11.11) (-12.93) (-0.48) (3.30) (11.12) (-12.99) (-0.53) (3.26) (11.13)
Payout -0.485*** 0.027*** -0.040*** 0.277*** -0.486*** 0.027*** -0.040*** 0.278*** -0.485*** 0.027*** -0.040*** 0.278***
(-16.43) (4.73) (-3.53) (7.50) (-16.47) (4.71) (-3.53) (7.52) (-16.44) (4.71) (-3.52) (7.52)
Volatility -0.014*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.021***
(-2.68) (-4.95) (-0.34) (-7.42) (-2.65) (-5.00) (-0.34) (-7.41) (-2.61) (-4.97) (-0.32) (-7.41)
Turnover 0.010*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.010*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.010*** -0.000*** 0.001*** -0.002***
(25.59) (-5.61) (5.74) (-9.99) (25.65) (-5.59) (5.74) (-10.03) (25.66) (-5.58) (5.75) (-10.02)
Price 0.007*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.003***
(10.19) (0.18) (11.92) (4.96) (10.21) (0.23) (11.90) (4.93) (10.18) (0.21) (11.89) (4.93)
Return−3,0 0.008*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.005*** 0.008*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.005***
(7.27) (-2.01) (-6.41) (-9.73) (7.27) (-1.99) (-6.41) (-9.75) (7.26) (-2.00) (-6.42) (-9.74)
Return−12,−3 0.010*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.010*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.010*** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.003***
(15.88) (-2.33) (-9.36) (-11.68) (15.89) (-2.31) (-9.37) (-11.69) (15.88) (-2.32) (-9.37) (-11.68)
N 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716 41,716
R¯2 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.32 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.32 0.30 0.07 0.13 0.32
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2.6 Conclusion
Our study documents that customer profile shapes the equity ownership structure among in-
stitutional investors with heterogeneous investment horizons. We find that higher customer
concentration is associated with an increase in short-term, but a decrease in long-term in-
stitutional ownership.
We find that the trade-off between benefits and costs associated with a concentrated
customer base can explain our empirical findings. With a concentrated customer base, the
increased risk deters long-term institutional investors from investing in these firms, but the
improved stock liquidity attracts short-term institutional investors. From the perspective of
institutional investors, we offer new insights on the costs and benefits of business relationships
along the supply chain. We also exploit alternative possible mechanisms. We do not find
support for either information transfer along the supply chain or future abnormal stock
returns associated with customer concentration.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Country-level and Firm-level Measures
Variable Definition Data source
Firm-level variables
I Capital expenditure scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets Worldscope
q Total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity divided by total
assets.
Worldscope
CF Net income before extraordinary items/preferred dividends plus depreciation and amortiza-
tion scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets
Worldscope
∆ Equity The change in the sum of the book value of equity and the deferred taxes, minus the change
in retained earnings, scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets
Worldscope
∆ Debt The change in the total debt scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets Worldscope
Measures for economic development
GDPC Log of gross domestic product per capita measured in constant 2005 US$ WDI
Electricity Consumption Electric power consumption measured by the production of power plants and combined heat
and power plants less transmission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by
heat and power plants (kWh per capita)
WDI
Secondary Education
Enrollment
Total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the
population of official secondary education age
WDI
R&D Capital expenditures (both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically
to increase knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use
of knowledge for new applications (% of GDP)
WDI
FDI The sum of foreign direct investment net inflows and net outflows, both of which are absolute
values. (% of GDP)
WDI
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Appendix A - Continued
Country-level and Firm-level Measures
Variable Definition Data source
Measures for financial development
Stock Market Develop-
ment
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) WDI
Cost of Equity Financing The average of four different implied cost of equity estimates following: (i) Gebhardt, Lee,
and Swaminathan’s (2001) residual income valuation model; (ii) Claus and Thomas’s (2001)
residual income valuation model; (iii) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) abnormal earn-
ings growth valuation model; and finally (iv) Easton’s (2004) MPEG ratio (price-to-earnings
ratios divided by growth rate) model
IBES&Worldscope
Private Credit Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (% of GDP) WDI
Portfolio equity inflows Net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct investment and includ-
ing shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares
in local stock markets by foreign investors (% of GDP)
WDI
Protection Principal component of disclosure, liability standards, and anti-director rights La Porta et al.
(2006)
Disclosure The arithmetic mean of prospect, compensation, shareholders, inside ownership, contracts
irregular, and transactions
La Porta et al.
(2006)
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Appendix B
Correlation Matrix
The table reports the correlation matrix of our main country-level variables, namely GDP per capita (GDPC), electricity consumption per
capita, secondary school enrollment ratio, R&D expenses, FDI, stock market development, cost of equity financing, private credit, portfolio
equity net inflows, protection, and disclosure. All these variables are defined in Appendix A. ICF sensitivity is estimated using firms within
a country for each year. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
Electricity Sec School Stock Market Cost of Private Equity Portfolio Disclosure
ICF GDPC Consumption Enrollment R&D FDI Development Equity Credit Inflows Protection Disclosure
ICF 1.000
GDPC -0.218*** 1.000
Electricity -0.200*** 0.737*** 1.000
Consumption
Sec School -0.195*** 0.748*** 0.551*** 1.000
Enrollment
R&D -0.249*** 0.620*** 0.580*** 0.453*** 1.000
FDI -0.165*** 0.263*** 0.186*** 0.134*** 0.020 1.000
Stock Market -0.146*** 0.223*** 0.144*** 0.035 0.012 0.382*** 1.000
Development
Cost of Equity 0.191*** -0.417*** -0.281*** -0.355*** -0.338*** -0.057 -0.144*** 1.000
Financing
Private Credit -0.274*** 0.588*** 0.444*** 0.370*** 0.419*** 0.297*** 0.389*** -0.383*** 1.000
Portfolio Equity -0.072* 0.156*** 0.173*** 0.028 -0.011 0.476*** 0.092** -0.010 0.124*** 1.000
Inflows
Protection -0.146*** -0.164*** 0.076* -0.095** -0.056 0.112*** 0.348*** -0.051 0.190*** 0.031 1.000
Disclosure -0.169*** 0.031 0.165*** -0.127*** 0.081* 0.101** 0.402*** -0.263*** 0.407*** 0.070* 0.643*** 1.000
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Appendix C
Ownership, Customer Concentration and Firm Characteristics
Variable Definition
Customer Concentration
Total Customer Sales The sum of sales to all major customers divided by the supplier’s
total sales.
Customer HHI The sum of squared sales percentages to major customers.
Largest Customer The sales percentage to the customer who accounts for the largest
share of the supplier’s total sales.
Institutional Ownership
ST % The number of shares owned by short-term institutional investors
divided by total number of shares outstanding. Institutional in-
vestors whose average portfolio churn rate over the last four quar-
ters is higher than at least 2/3 of all institutions in a quarter are
defined as short-term.
LT % The number of shares owned by long-term institutional investors
divided by total number of shares outstanding. Institutional in-
vestors whose average portfolio churn rate over the last four quar-
ters is lower than at least 2/3 of all institutions in a quarter are
defined as long-term.
Total % The number of shares owned by all institutional investors divided
by total number of shares outstanding.
Firm Characteristics
Tobin’s q Total assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value
of equity divided by total assets.
Size The log of market capitalization of a firm.
Age The log of number of years since the first year the firm appears in
Compustat.
Payout Dividends divided by market capitalization of a firm.
Volatility The standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the past year.
Turnover The monthly trading volume divided by total number of shares
outstanding.
Price The log of stock price.
Return−3,0 Past 3-month cumulative stock return.
Return−12,−3 9-month cumulative stock return ended 3 months prior to the fiscal
year-end.
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